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THEY COULD BE BACK:                           
THE POSSIBILITY OF TERMINATION 
RIGHTS FOR SESSION MUSICIANS 
ALEXANDRA EL-BAYEH 
Beginning in 2013, many musicians became eligible to regain rights they 
assigned to recording companies thirty-five years ago.  Through a provision of 
the Copyright Act, artists can “terminate” these rights and regain control of 
their work as long as the work was not a “work for hire.”  This Comment 
focuses on session musicians’ ability to claim termination rights in their 
creative contributions to sound recordings. Session musicians have been the 
focus of increased attention because many of them signed away their rights for 
little payment and control and without knowing the future possible uses of 
their works, particularly in digital sampling. 
This Comment first considers whether these session musicians qualify as 
employees for hire under the statutory definition and subsequent work-for-hire 
doctrine.  After determining that these musicians are not always employees for 
hire, this Comment examines the types of authorship claims they have at their 
disposal.  Most session musicians will not be able to claim joint authorship 
under the current doctrine, but they may have the ability to claim copyright in 
independently contributed material.  Due to these authorship claims, the 
session musicians will be able to exercise termination in certain circumstances. 
                                                          
   Articles Editor, American University Law Review, Volume 64; J.D. Candidate, 
May 2015, American University Washington College of Law; B.A., English and Music, 
2012, College of the Holy Cross.  Thank you to Professor Peter Jaszi for the guidance and 
support both in deciding on this topic and its development.  Also, thank you to the 
AULR staff for their skillful edits and to my family and friends for their constant 
support.  And thank you to all the musical people in my life who have helped me 
talk through this Comment and continue to inspire me to explore the intersection 
of law and music. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Victor Willis was one of the lead singers of the Village People, but 
he has been unable to control the use of his biggest hit, “Y.M.C.A.,” 
for over thirty-five years.1  Willis, like many artists, assigned the rights 
in the song to the record company; as a result, the record company 
maintained sole control over the song’s use and licensing.2  Now, 
                                                          
 1. Larry Rohter, A Copyright Victory, 35 Years Later, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/11/arts/music/a-copyright-victory-35-years-later.html. 
 2. Id. 
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thirty-five years later, Willis has regained the rights to his famous song 
due to a provision in the 1976 Copyright Act that allows artists to 
terminate rights previously assigned to the recording company.3  This 
“termination right” allows artists like Willis, who quickly signed away 
their rights in the glory of the moment, to come back and bargain 
with large record companies on more equal footing.4 
Now imagine you are an artist who has performed on countless 
chart-topping hits, but unlike Mr. Willis, you were not a group’s lead 
singer.  Imagine further that your records are “classics” and as prolific 
as the “Y.M.C.A.” but that you are not a household name.  Unlike 
Willis, you received no royalties for your creative contributions over 
the past thirty-five years but, rather, a mere one-time payment under 
the umbrella of “work for hire.”  Then imagine that your creative 
contributions were used to supplement other artists’ hits, but you 
received neither compensation nor credit on the record.  Welcome 
to the life of a session musician. 
Session musicians are artists who support lead artists’ work and 
provide background vocals or instrumental accompaniment.5  Session 
musicians are highly skilled, and many of them are treasured by the 
music industry for their contributions to numerous successful tracks.6  
Many of the most famous songs become what they are due to the 
                                                          
 3. Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2012) (outlining the statutory termination right 
for transfers and licenses granted by authors). 
 4. Rohter, supra note 1. 
 5. For the purposes of this Comment, I will focus on certain types of session 
musicians.  The term “session musicians” could possibly encompass members of a 
band that support the featured artist or members of a band that work in one 
particular studio on a regular basis.  However, artists in both of those situations most 
likely fall into the work-for-hire exception of termination.  Considering that session 
musicians may likely fall into a spectrum of employment relationships, I will focus on 
those who are hired at will by the studios when they are needed and not for extended 
periods.  These musicians are the most likely to fall outside of the work-for-hire 
exception.  A more fact-specific analysis will follow in the second half of this 
Comment.  See infra Part II.A. 
 6. See Evan Andrews, Top Ten Session Musicians and Studio Bands, TOPTENZ (July 
1, 2011), http://www.toptenz.net/top-10-session-musicians-and-studio-bands.php 
(listing several top session musicians and their contributions to various artists’ 
works).  For example, Thomas Lang is a prolific drummer who has worked with the 
likes of Peter Gabriel and Kelly Clarkson.  Id.  Recent documentaries have also 
featured and focused on session musicians’ lives.  For example, 20 Feet from Stardom, 
which discusses the untold glory of several background singers during the 1970s and 
1980s, won an Academy Award for Best Picture.  See generally 20 FEET FROM STARDOM, 
http://twentyfeetfromstardom.com (last visited Dec. 21, 2014). 
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talents of musicians who are paid a marginal lump sum fee.7  Session 
musicians are underappreciated and often overlooked.  As some 
involved in the music industry have suggested, “[y]ou might not have 
heard their names, but you’ve definitely heard their music.”8 
Typically, a recording studio hires session musicians to play 
background for a lead artist on a particular track.9  Many artists, 
particularly those who are new to the music business, are quick to 
sign paperwork assigning all of their rights to the record company.10  
These contracts typically include a work-for-hire agreement11—and 
therein lies the problem.  If a sound recording is legally considered a 
work for hire, then the artist cannot terminate that right because the 
employer—in this case the studio—is the sole owner of the 
copyright.12  However, session musicians often add real creative 
contributions to the work.13 
It remains possible that these employment contracts are not 
sufficient to create a work for hire in all cases or that not all session 
musicians signed such contracts. If the actual nature of the 
employment relationship does not satisfy certain criteria, then the 
                                                          
 7. See Andrews, supra note 6 (providing examples of well-known artists who have 
been supported by very talented session musicians). 
 8. Id. 
 9. See Life as a Studio Musician, RECORDING CONNECTION, http://www.recording 
connection.com/reference-library/recording-entrepreneurs/life-as-a-studio-
musician-0411 (last visited Dec. 21, 2014) (detailing the typical work that a session 
musician will encounter in today’s world). 
 10. There are generally two kinds of copyrights in music:  the musical 
composition and the sound recording.  17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2), (7) (2012).  The 
musical composition is the underlying arrangement of a piece and is typically 
captured in the notes on a page or on a sound recording.  See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
COPYRIGHT CIRCULAR 56A, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION OF MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS AND 
SOUND RECORDINGS 1 (2012), available at http://copyright.gov/circs/circ56a.pdf; see 
also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53 (1976) (finding that “musical composition” did not 
need a statutory definition because it had a “fairly settled” meaning).  The sound 
recording, by comparison, is the audible product of the musicians’ work within the 
session on that particular performance.  17 U.S.C. § 101.  Though session musicians 
probably do not author underlying musical compositions, they do contribute to 
sound recordings. 
 11. E.g., Musician/Vocalist Work for Hire Agreement, SUPER DEMOS, http://super-
demos.com/images/Super%20Demos%20Work%20For%20Hire%20Agreement.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 21, 2014). 
 12. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (eliminating work for hires from termination rights). 
 13. See, e.g., Ron Zabrocki, Session Guitar:  A Week in the Life of a Busy Session 
Guitarist, GUITAR WORLD (Oct. 6, 2011, 11:51 AM), http://www.guitarworld.com/ 
session-guitar-week-life-busy-session-guitarist (detailing the typical work of a guitar 
session musician who is often sent tracks that “are basically a beat, some bass and 
some chords,” which he then supplements with original work). 
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contract will likely be deemed an assignment.14  If there was an 
assignment, then the creator has a right to terminate.15  The 
termination right allows those who assigned their rights to get 
another chance to reconsider the terms of these agreements.16 
Once the right of termination is established, one must consider the 
relevant musician’s actual authorship claims.  Because many session 
musicians are likely to contribute significantly to a piece, it would 
seem possible that some session musicians could be joint owners of 
the copyright.  In order to be joint owners, two or more people must 
intend to contribute to the same work.17  Though on its face joint 
ownership would appear to apply to session musicians, a string of 
cases has limited potential joint authors’ ability to bring such claims.18  
Even if such joint authorship claims fail, courts could alter the 
interpretation of the § 101 definition of joint authorship to support 
these types of contributors.19  Alternatively, it may be possible for 
session musicians to claim independently copyright content 
depending in part on the outcome of a case in the Ninth Circuit. 
Record companies fear termination for many reasons, including, 
most obviously, the loss of future profits from sales of the recording,20 
but there are several clear inequities that effect session musicians in 
the current industry structure.  One issue that particularly highlights 
                                                          
 14. When artists assign their rights, they lose all control over the future use of the 
work.  This includes all of the rights outlined in the Copyright Act, such as 
reproduction, distribution, and public performance rights.  17 U.S.C. § 106.  Since 
the recording company controls these rights, depending on the terms of the 
contract, the artist does not choose how or when his or her works are used, the sale 
price, or future licensing agreements.  Oftentimes, these rights are very important to 
the artist, and therefore termination can play a large role in helping an artist to 
regain control over a recording. 
 15. Id. § 203 (detailing the conditions and effect of termination). 
 16. Id. § 203(b). 
 17. Id. § 101. 
 18. See infra Part II.B (explaining that joint authorship does not qualify many 
session musicians for authorship). 
 19. See infra Parts I.F, II.C (discussing the expanding scope of judicial joint 
authorship doctrines and using individual copyrightable content as a broader means 
of termination). 
 20. See, e.g., Daniel Gould, Time’s Up:  Copyright Termination, Work-for-Hire and the 
Recording Industry, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 91, 93–94 (2007) (listing recording 
companies’ possible fears for termination, such as (1) due to the Internet, the value 
of old works is not restricted by shelf-space, (2) older records can return a higher 
profit since they are already established, and (3) labels are valuated based on the 
worth of their catalogs and predictability of intellectual property). 
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this inequity is the new practice of digital sampling.21  Though the law 
in the sampling arena is somewhat complex, it requires that an artist 
typically pay to license the sample if the artist uses more than a very 
minor part of the original work.22 
Session musicians who now have the ability to exercise termination 
rights for recordings from thirty-five years ago did not consider this 
technology when and if they signed work-for-hire agreements.  Many 
of the samples used are of a session musician’s guitar riff, vocal 
harmony, or other creative contribution, yet the session musicians 
will receive little to no payment for licensing because they signed 
away all of their rights to the work.23  Termination rights could help 
to overcome this injustice because even if artists elected to reassign 
their copyrights in their works, they could at least renegotiate new 
deals with the recording companies, keeping in mind both possible 
new revenue streams and the potential to exercise increased artistic 
control over their work. 
This Comment argues that session musicians should be able to 
exercise termination rights in their works because their works are not 
works for hire and because session musicians have authorship claims 
in their contributions to sound recordings.  Even if certain session 
musicians cannot be considered joint authors, they should at least be 
able to claim copyright protection in the part of the piece that they 
individually contributed.  Part I of this Comment provides 
background information on music industry practices with regard to 
session musicians and digital sampling as well as a summary of work-
for-hire and other authorship doctrines.  Part II analyzes session 
musicians’ ability to overcome work-for-hire obstacles despite their 
weak claims to joint authorship in works and recommends courts 
marginally change their interpretation of the Copyright Act.  Part II 
then analyzes an alternative form of authorship that could help 
session musicians retain copyrights.  Part III recommends 
interpreting the law in favor of session musicians and considers 
                                                          
 21. Samplers use parts of sound recordings to mix in new songs.  Tracy L. Reilly, 
Debunking the Top Three Myths of Digital Sampling:  An Endorsement of the Bridgeport 
Music Court’s Attempt to Afford “Sound” Copyright Protection to Sound Recordings, 31 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 355, 356 (2008). 
 22. See id. at 364 (finding that most risk averse artists will seek licenses to 
sample music). 
 23. See David S. Bloch, “Give the Drummer Some!”:  On the Need for Enhanced 
Protection of Drum Beats, 14 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 187, 196–97 (1997) 
(indicating that original artists rarely receive attribution or payment for samples of 
drum beats in rap music). 
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alternative means to aid session musicians that fall outside of this 
legal framework.  Finally, Part III focuses on the future of session 
musicians and their contributions to the music industry and 
concludes that termination is a viable means of gaining rights for 
session musicians that are significant contributors. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Recording Industry 
1. Business logistics for session musicians 
Session musicians have been used throughout the modern music 
era and have contributed to many recordings.24  Session musicians 
are very skilled players who act as backup to the main act on a record.  
These musicians can often sight-read25 a piece with little to no 
rehearsal time, though it is not unheard of for a session musician to 
not read music at all during a session.26  Many of these musicians, 
particularly in musical genres that value improvisation, are given a 
very basic sheet with chord progressions or a basic recording and are 
told to improvise over a line.27 
Session musicians are necessary to the creation of the record, and 
some have gained such a special prominence in their role that main 
artists will wait to record until a specific musician with the right sound 
and technique for the record is available.28  Session players have to 
not only read the parts but also interpret them and improvise when 
                                                          
 24. See supra note 9 (discussing the current use of session musicians in musical works). 
 25. Sight-reading is the act of playing music without ever having seen or read the 
sheet music beforehand. 
 26. See JENNIFER EMBER PIERCE, PLAYIN’ AROUND:  THE LIVES AND CAREERS OF 
FAMOUS SESSION MUSICIANS xvii (1998) (“I have never seen anyone read from sheet 
music during a recording session; however, many session musicians have learned to 
read music.”); see also A Personal View of Session Programmers, Part 1:  Musicians, SOUND 
ON SOUND (Oct. 1998), https://www.soundonsound.com/sos/oct98/articles/ 
sessionmusic.html (stating that the ability to sight-read is essential and finding that 
some session musicians cannot even read music); 20 FEET FROM STARDOM (Gil Friesen 
2013) (stating that certain background vocalists were almost encouraged to 
improvise instead of strictly adhering to the sheet music). 
 27. See A DAY IN THE LIFE OF A NASHVILLE SESSION MUSICIAN (Artists House Music 
interview Dec. 2007), available at http://www.artistshousemusic.org/videos/ 
a+day+in+the+life+of+a+nashville+session+musician (interviewing Dan Needham, a 
session drummer, about typical recording sessions and the amount of guidance 
session musicians receive from producers); Zabrocki, supra, note 13 (detailing a session 
guitarist’s busy routine and the typical lack of pronounced music detail required). 
 28. PIERCE, supra note 26, at xvi. 
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needed.29  Steve Lukather was a prominent session musician in the 
1970’s and 1980’s who participated in thousands of recordings before 
going on to found his own band with other legendary session 
musicians.30  He has noted the importance of the session musician in 
creating actual content for the lead artists who often give little initial 
direction.31  The key to excelling as a session musician, therefore, 
often requires making significant creative contributions as well as 
having the ability to follow direction.32  David Lasley—a prominent 
background singer for the likes of James Taylor and Aretha 
Franklin—once stated, “[As] a background singer they would like you 
to come in, make the thing sound great, take very little credit, and 
leave quickly.”33 
Certain musicians are well known and respected as session 
musicians and can make a decent living and maintain relative security 
in their employment.34  Session musicians are paid by the job.35  
Salary rates are often established through unions or the industry and 
may appear generous on their face.36  However, considering the 
                                                          
 29. David Konow, First Call:  The Top Studio Guitarists of the ‘70’s and ‘80’s Look 
Back, GUITAR INT’L, http://guitarinternational.com/2010/09/30/first-call-the-top-
studio-guitarists-of-the-%E2%80%9870%E2%80%99s-and-%E2%80%9880%E2%80% 
99s-look-back (last visited Dec. 21, 2014). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. (“Somebody would give you like 85 bars of E written on a piece of paper, 
and all of [a] sudden all the guys in the band would rewrite this song for these 
people.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 32. Jimmy Page was a session musician before he founded Led Zeppelin, but he 
is well known for his guitar work on many prominent recordings as well.  Michael 
Gallucci, Top 10 Pre-Led Zeppelin Jimmy Page Songs, ULTIMATE CLASSIC ROCK, 
http://ultimateclassicrock.com/pre-led-zeppelin-jimmy-page-songs (last visited Dec. 
21, 2014).  Modern successful background singers were also unlikely to focus on the 
music on the page itself as much as the “feeling” that the artist wanted to provoke.  
See 20 FEET FROM STARDOM, supra note 26. 
 33. 20 FEET FROM STARDOM, supra note 26. 
 34. See PIERCE, supra note 26, at xvi (admitting that some artists only record when 
the best session musicians are available); see also Andrews, supra note 6 (listing top 
session musicians and groups they have supported). 
 35. Some studios will maintain in-house bands, but this Comment will focus on 
musicians that are hired by the job. 
 36. Zach O’Malley Greenburg, How to Make a Living in the Modern Music Business:  
12 Music Jobs that Can Pay Six Figures, FORBES (Jan. 23, 2013, 1:05 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/zackomalleygreenburg/2013/01/23/how-to-make-a-
living-in-the-modern-music-business. See generally AM. FED’N MUSICIANS SOUND 
RECORDING, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF MUSICIANS SOUND RECORDING SCALES (NON-
SYMPHONIC) (2014), available at http://www.afm.org/uploads/file/SRLA%20-
%20Non-Symphonic%20Scales_Rev_%20031314(final).pdf (detailing pay grades for 
different types of sessions). 
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possible future revenue that session musicians forsake when they sign 
work-for-hire contracts, the salary is not as generous as it may first 
appear.  Under the current union regulations for a three-hour 
session, a session musician will be paid $397.36, but the lead musician 
will be paid $794.72 and may have the opportunity for royalties and 
termination.37  The union contracts also require that session 
musicians receive health insurance and pensions.38  Non-union 
musicians may not receive such benefits and are not restricted to 
minimum rate standards. 
The payments session musicians receive depend on whether they 
are members of unions, the performers’ relative skills, and the types 
of uses for their work.  The American Federation of Musicians 
(“AFM”) and the Screen Actors Guild and the American Federation 
of Television and Radio Artists (“SAG-AFTRA”) provide very strict pay 
and employment rates for various types of musicians in different 
jobs.39  The union contracts have strict hiring policies and rates per 
hour for session musicians.40  For sound recordings under AFM, the 
session musician will typically make about half of what the lead artist 
makes for the session and will not receive royalty payments.41 
Record companies often ask session musicians to sign a contract 
indicating that their recordings are works for hire.  Typically, 
boilerplate language in these contracts states that the musician’s 
“performances shall be considered as works made for hire.”42  This 
language would, at first blush, appear to give away all future rights to 
a work by making the musician an employee for hire because under 
the law a work for hire cannot be terminated.  The recording 
companies are therefore trying to preempt a session musician’s 
termination right, but courts would look beyond the mere contract 
                                                          
 37. AM. FED’N MUSICIANS SOUND RECORDING, supra note 36, at 1. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Sound Recordings, AM. FED’N MUSICIANS, http://www.afm.org/ 
departments/electronic-media-services-division/sound-recordings (last visited Dec. 
21, 2014) (providing sample labor agreements and protections given to artists in the 
recording studio); Sound Recordings, SAG-AFTRA, http://www.sagaftra.org/ 
soundrecordings (last visited Dec. 21, 2014) (showing rates for music royalties in the 
television and film industry). 
 40. See generally AM. FED’N MUSICIANS SOUND RECORDING, supra note 36 (listing the 
pay scales for side and lead musicians, which differ based on the length and type of 
session in question). 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Musician/Vocalist Work for Hire Agreement, SUPER DEMOS, http://super-
demos.com/images/Super%20Demos%20Work%20For%20Hire%20Agreement.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 21, 2014). 
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language to the actual relationship between the session artist and 
recording studio or lead musician in order to determine whether it 
truly is a work for hire.43  Session musicians who might not have the 
legal savvy or the standing in the industry to negotiate the terms often 
sign such contracts. 
Sound recordings have different types of rights attached compared 
to other copyrighted works, thus leading to an often complicated 
royalty breakdown for the artists involved. Owners of sound recording 
copyrights do not have a “right of performance”44—a right that 
enables radio stations to license only the musical rights without 
paying extra for the recording rights.45  On the other hand, digital 
performance rights are protected under another provision of the 
Copyright Act so that digital audio services like Pandora have to pay 
an extra licensing fee to use them.46  Though this may appear like a 
bizarre distinction in itself, Congress made the change to support 
artists to some extent when radio stations play the artists’ recordings 
even though the change did not alter the use of the recordings on 
terrestrial radio.47  Consequently, because the royalty disbursement 
for digital royalties is statutorily required, SoundExchange must 
distribute a portion of the royalties to session musicians.48  The 
session musicians receive five percent of the royalties, the lead artist 
                                                          
 43. See infra Part II.A (arguing that session musicians should not generally be 
considered workers for hire). 
 44. 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (2012). 
 45. Id. § 114(d)(1). 
 46. Id. § 114(d)(2).  See generally About Pandora, PANDORA, http://www.pandora.com/ 
about (last visited Dec. 21, 2014) (describing how Pandora uses an algorithm enabling 
subscribers to explore new artists and musical genres based on individual preferences). 
 47. See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995:  Hearings on H.R. 
1506 Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Prop. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 
104th Cong. 187 (1995) (prepared statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of 
Copyrights and Associate Librarian for Copyright Services, Library of Congress) 
(testifying to the U.S. Copyright Office’s conclusions regarding proposed changes to 
copyright legislation, including that sound recordings “fully warrant” a performance 
right so that artists can share in “at least some share” of their works’ commercial uses 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 48. Cf. About Digital Royalties, SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com/ 
artist-copyright-owner/digital-royalties (last visited Dec. 21, 2014) (defining “digital 
royalties” as “fees that digital radio services, such as Pandora, . . . are required by law 
to pay for streaming music” that must be “allocate[d] . . . [to] the featured artist(s) 
and copyright owners of those recordings”).  SoundExchange is “the independent 
nonprofit performance rights organization that collects and distributes digital 
performance royalties to featured artists and copyright holders.”  About, 
SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com/about (last visited Dec. 21, 2014). 
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receives forty-five percent, and the owner of the “master” of the 
sound recording receives fifty percent.49 
Session musicians also receive marginal revenue when their work is 
used for another purpose outside of the original contracted purpose.  
In these cases, session musicians are entitled to residual payments, or 
“mailbox money.”50  An example would be a sound recording used 
for a hit television show’s opening credits.51  However, residual 
payments are uncommon, and session musicians have little say in 
whether they receive residual payments because they have no say in 
the future use of their work.52 
Session musicians not only play an important role in the recording 
industry, but they also often play a significant role in the particular 
recordings they are hired to support.  While recent changes in union 
contracts have attempted to lend further support to session 
musicians, a wide disparity between musicians’ compensation—either 
in contractual or monetary terms—and their potential contributions 
continues to exist. 
2. The law regarding digital music sampling 
Music sampling is another relatively new discovery in music 
industry terms.  Sampling is the art of mixing music by borrowing 
small snippets of sound from other recordings.53  Sampling as we 
know it has now been popular for over a decade, but it began its 
ascent in the late 1970’s and gained widespread popularity in the 
1980’s and 1990’s.54  Sampling has become a powerful and prevalent 
means of creating music in the modern era.55  Not only is the 
equipment, such as the mixing software, relatively inexpensive and 
easy to obtain, but there is also a widespread culture of sampling, 
leading to its growing acceptance, and various licensing schemes that 
exist.56  Though the union contracts do provide small residual 
                                                          
 49. 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(2)(C). 
 50. See BACKGROUND VOCALIST, FUTURE OF MUSIC COAL. 15 (2014), available 
at http://money.futureofmusic.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/ 
ARScasestudyAY.pdf (providing a detailed account of the various uses and reuses that 
allow artists to claim residual payments). 
 51. See, e.g., Residuals FAQ, SAG-AFTRA, http://www.sagaftra.org/content/ 
residuals-faq (last visited Dec. 21, 2014) (explaining who is entitled to receive 
residual payments and when they are entitled to receive them). 
 52. BACKGROUND VOCALIST, supra note 50, at 15–16. 
 53. Reilly, supra note 21, at 356. 
 54. See generally id. at 358–61 (detailing the history of digital sampling). 
 55. Id. at 361. 
 56. Id. 
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compensation for use of samples, the fee is marginal at best 
compared to the profit margin for the recording companies.57  Also, 
these residual payment agreements were not written into the AFM 
recording agreements until 1995, after sampling was already long 
underway.58  Subsequently, this left many musicians whose songs were 
sampled before 1995 without any reimbursement.59  Moreover, the 
ease and proliferation of sampling actually replaces musicians.60  
Because the sampler can have a guitar riff without a guitar, sampling 
actually hurts session musicians in more ways than one. 
Sampling has led to many legal questions that are likely to affect 
session musicians.  The legal fight regarding sampling has been 
fraught with many disagreements about the legal and moral 
implications of digital sampling.  One of the leading cases on digital 
sampling begins, “[T]hou shalt not steal.”61  Though courts have 
                                                          
 57. Under the current AFM Sound Recording Labor Agreement, the licensing 
record company must pay a one-time $400 fee to a “Sound Recording Special 
Payments Fund” regardless of how many times the sample is used on a new song.  
AM. FED’N MUSICIANS, SOUND RECORDING LABOR AGREEMENT WITH THE SOUND 
RECORDING SPECIAL PAYMENTS FUND AGREEMENT (SPF) AND SOUND RECORDING TRUST 
AGREEMENT (MPTF), FEBRUARY 1, 2002–JANUARY 31, 2005 exh. A I.A.(9)(b)(i).  The 
fund must also include two percent of the gross revenue received by the company for 
any use that exceeds $25,000.  Id. exh. A I.A.(9)(b)(ii).  However, the fund that the 
company pays into will compensate all “Covered Musicians” who performed on the 
track equally.  Id. exh. A I.A.(9)(g).  A “Covered Musician” does not include royalty-
earning musicians or symphonic musicians.  Id. exh. A I.A.(a)(1).  Any remixes of the 
songs that use the sample will not require further payments into the fund.  
Therefore, these union agreements do little to compensate the actual performer of 
the sampled piece since the company splits the marginal payment between all 
musicians on the recording.  Id. exh. A I.A.(9)(a)(5).  Much like other residual 
payments, the licensing itself is not at the will of the musician, but is left to the 
recording company to decide.  Between the small amount, the lack of 
personalization to the particular musician, and the lack of control, these payments 
do not compensate for the need for increased direct control by musicians. 
 58. See Christopher D. Abramson, Note, Digital Sampling and the Recording 
Musician:  A Proposal for Legislative Protection, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1660, 1674 (1999) 
(noting that even though the union discussed addressing sampling as early as 1987, 
the actual first agreement to do so was not released until 1995). 
 59. See generally 20 FEET FROM STARDOM, supra note 26 (discussing early session 
singers and their lack of compensation or credit); COPYRIGHT CRIMINALS (Copyright 
Criminals, LLC 2009) (describing the realities faced by early session musicians like 
Clyde Stubblefield). 
 60. Abramson, supra note 58, at 1667–68 (adding that producers can “save 
money (by not hiring a musician) without sacrificing the sound and phrasing of a 
live musician in the song”). 
 61. Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182, 
183 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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disagreed about how much of a sample may be taken without 
permission, based on existing case law, it likely would be much safer 
for a recording artist to request a license from the owner of the 
sampled work before using that work in a recording intended for 
mass distribution.62  Courts have found copyright infringement63 even 
                                                          
 62. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 272, 
275, 278 (6th Cir. 2009) (affirming the district court’s finding that the defendant’s 
use of the word “dog” in a low voice, the rhythmic panting, and the Bow Wow 
reference (“bow wow wow, yippie yo, yippie yea”) infringed the plaintiff’s tracks).  In 
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit approved the district court’s use of the “fragmented literal similarity” 
standard where the jury was asked to look solely at the particular use of the work 
when it determined infringement rather than at the work as a whole.  Id. at 275 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The relative importance of the portion of the 
sampled song is key to determining infringement under this standard.  Id. at 275–76.  
Under this standard, it is also likely that most samples would be infringing.  Samplers 
admit that they will use a sound recording as a form of musical allusion to evoke the 
popularity of a particular piece; therefore, it is likely that the part of the piece they 
use is a crucial component.  See COPYRIGHT CRIMINALS, supra note 59 (discussing the 
reason for session musicians’ trade and the use of popular beats as an illustration).  
There is, however, room for possible fair use claims, but the courts have not fully 
explored that avenue yet, and the recording industry operates on a presumption of 
licensing fees.  See DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, COPYRIGHT 
POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 28–29 (2013), available 
at http://www.uspto.gov/news/publications/copyrightgreenpaper.pdf (discussing 
the controversial use of fair use as applied to remix culture).  Fair use acts as a 
defense to an infringement of a copyrighted work by balancing four factors:  “(1) the 
purpose and character of the use . . . ; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) 
the amount and substantiality of the portion used . . . ; and (4) the effect of the use 
on the potential market for or value . . . .”  17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).  In recent cases, 
the “transformative” purpose of the work as it relates to the first factor has come to 
the forefront of the factor analysis, but the doctrine itself continues to expand.  See 
generally PETER JASZI, HEARING ON THE “THE SCOPE OF FAIR USE” HOUSE JUDICIARY 
COMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEE ON COURTS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE INTERNET 4 
(2014), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/_cache/files/496f0a48-1c95-4f88-aabf-
9a98b0b22aa7/012814-testimony---jaszi.pdf. 
 63. For a prima facie copyright infringement claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate 
that (1) he owned a valid copyright, (2) the defendant copied the work, and (3) 
there was an improper appropriation.  See 17 U.S.C. § 501(b); see also CRAIG JOYCE ET 
AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 636–37 (9th ed. 2013) (indicating that while courts generally 
agree on the elements of a prima face copyright case, they do not agree on how to 
define the standard for infringement).  Defendants can argue under the “improper 
appropriation” element that even if they copied the plaintiff’s work, they only relied 
on a lawful amount (also called a de minimis use) or a part of the work that is not 
copyrightable.  JOYCE ET AL., supra, at 637; see also Feist Publ’ns, Inc., v. Rural Tel. Serv. 
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (“Not all copying . . . is copyright infringement.”). 
EL-BAYEH.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 2/3/2015  8:13 PM 
298 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:285 
in cases where very small snippets of music are used, causing samplers 
to license materials to avoid risking infringement.64 
B. A Brief Introduction to Musical Copyright Law 
American copyright law and American intellectual property law 
generally find their beginnings in the Constitution’s Intellectual 
Property Clause, which states that Congress has the power to enact 
laws to “promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing 
for limited times to author and inventors the exclusive right to their 
respective writings and discoveries.”65  Unsurprisingly, as culture and 
technology changed, so too have the contours of federal copyright 
law.  The Copyright Act66 was heavily revised in 1976 (“1976 Act” or 
“the Act”),67 and the 1976 Act remains the law today, with some more 
recent additions at the turn of the century.68  A copyright exists the 
moment a work is “fixed in any tangible medium of expression” so 
that others can perceive it.69  Fixation occurs when a work has 
maintained a sense of permanence for longer than a “transitory 
                                                          
 64. Some courts, like the Sixth Circuit, have taken the de minimis defense to 
infringement off the table.  See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 
F.3d 792, 801–02 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Get a license or do not sample. . . .  When you 
sample a sound recording you know you are taking another’s work product. . . .  It is 
a physical taking rather than an intellectual one.”).  A musician could easily mimic 
the sounds of these small snippets of music and not be an infringer; however, since 
the Sixth Circuit determined the act of digital sampling was a “physical taking,” the 
court refused to permit even small uses of a sound recording.  Id. at 802.  On the 
other hand, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found the sampling of a 
three-note flute solo was not an infringement because it was a de minimis use.  
Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 2004).  Because the circuits have 
split on the likely outcome of sampling cases, the law does not provide much 
guidance to samplers on whether their use will constitute an infringement.  
Commentators have criticized this strict approach regarding the finding of 
infringement in sampling.  See, e.g., Reilly, supra note 21, at 375 (analyzing the top 
arguments for and against sampling). 
 65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 66. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 67. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 68. See Copyright Timeline:  A History of Copyright in the United States, ASS’N RES. LIBR., 
http://www.arl.org/focus-areas/copyright-ip/2486-copyright-timeline#.VEr4QPnF9u0 
(last visited Dec. 21, 2014) (providing a brief history of U.S. copyright law and key 
statutory amendments). 
 69. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).  Under the 1976 Act, a copyright does not have to be 
registered, though registration provides certain advantages if done in a timely 
fashion.  Further, a copyright holder cannot sue for certain remedies for 
infringement unless the work has been registered.  Id. § 412. 
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duration.”70  Therefore, any sound recording, once it is created, will 
be copyrightable.  However, it is well within any copyright owner’s 
prerogative to assign these rights, as long as he does so in writing.71 
When it comes to sound recordings, two copyrights are present:  
one in the underlying musical work and a second in the particular 
recording.72  The 1976 Act did not define “musical compositions” 
because the term already had such a well-understood meaning.73  
Musical composition copyrights include the sheet music and 
underlying melodic material of the work as it is first fixed.74  The 
sound recording copyright, on the other hand, protects only the 
particular performance of the work fixed in the sound recording.75  
The Copyright Act defines sound recordings as “works that result 
from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but 
not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects, 
such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are 
embodied.”76  Protection for sound recordings was a much-needed 
addition to the realm of copyright,77 but there was little mention of 
authorship in the legislative history.78 
The copyright in a sound recording is subject to a lesser version of 
copyright than other works.  A copyright owner typically holds the 
right to reproduce the work, to prepare derivative works, to publicly 
distribute the work, to publicly perform the work, and to publicly 
display the work.79  Sound recording copyrights, however, carry a 
                                                          
 70. Id. § 101. 
 71. Id. § 204(a). 
 72. Id. § 102(a). 
 73. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53 (1976) (noting that it was not necessary to 
create a musical composition definition). 
 74. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2).  Although sheet music is the traditional way that the 
underlying music is fixed, any other method of fixation, including a recording, will do. 
 75. Id. § 101. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Sound recordings earned copyright protection beginning with the 1971 Act.  
Several years before Congress enacted the 1976 Act, the Senate Judiciary Committee 
estimated the cost of piracy of phonorecords at $100 million per year.  S. REP. NO. 92-
72, at 3–4 (1971).  In a report, the committee expressed concern that piracy 
negatively affected the recording industry as well as musicians.  Id. at 4. 
 78. Id. at 5 (“As in the case of motion pictures, the bill does not fix the 
authorship, or the resulting ownership, of sound recordings, but leaves these matters 
to the employment relationship and bargaining among the interests involved.”). 
 79. 17 U.S.C. § 106.  These rights are the same for all copyright owners, but their 
scope often becomes the subject of debate and controversy.  Reproduction is the 
creation of copies of a work that will be fixed in a “tangible medium of 
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limited performance right, so the copyright owner has the right to 
performance only “by means of digital audio transmission.”80  Even 
though owners of sound recordings have a limited set of rights, the 
person or entity that holds the copyright retains all possible profit 
and control of the work.81 
C. Work-for-Hire Clauses:  The Recording Companies’ Attempts at Control 
Understanding the work-for-hire doctrine is key to determining 
whether an artist can exercise his or her termination rights. The 
termination provision for post-1978 works is codified at 17 U.S.C. 
§ 203 and states that a work for hire cannot be terminated, whereas 
an “agreement to the contrary,” or assignment of any rights, can 
always be terminated.82  It is likely that many artists were induced to 
sign contracts that explicitly stated the work was “work for hire.”83  
                                                          
expression . . . sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory 
duration.”  Id. § 101.  Derivative works are “based upon one or more preexisting 
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, 
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, 
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or 
adapted.”  Id.  Public distribution is typically a transfer of ownership, either “by sale 
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending,” id. § 106, but there is 
some confusion over whether merely making a work publicly available qualifies as 
distribution, see Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 
203 (4th Cir. 1997) (creating a making available right in the library context).  There 
is also a limitation on the distribution right, called the first sale doctrine, which 
allows the purchaser of a copyrighted good to dispose of that particular copy as he 
sees fit.  17 U.S.C. § 109(a).  A public display or performance occurs “at any place 
where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its 
social acquaintances is gathered” or where it is communicated remotely to the public 
in a similar manner.  Id. § 101. 
 80. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6).  The specific sound recording rights are outlined in 17 
U.S.C. § 114 and include statutory licensing of certain types of transmissions. 
 81. See id. § 114 (explaining that limitations upon the rights of duplication do 
not impair the rights of the owner of the original sound recording). 
 82. Id. § 203(a); see also infra Part I.D (discussing the termination right). 
 83. See United States Copyright Office and Sound Recordings as Work Made for Hire:  
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
106th Cong. 17 (2000) [hereinafter Hearing:  Sound Recordings as Work Made for Hire] 
(prepared statement of Rep. Mary Bono, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) 
(“These young artists who are desperate to sign a contract to a record company are 
the backbone of the recording industry.  Any major artist had to make his or her start 
at the bottom as an unknown.  The negotiation power the record company has over 
the music artist is staggering.  The artist is so desperate to sign a contract for an 
album that the artists’ concern for his future financial well-being and possible royalty 
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Although, facially, this would appear to defeat any defense, that is not 
necessarily the case.  The Supreme Court has accepted the Restatement 
of Agency interpretation of work for hire, which looks not only at the 
terms of a contract but also at the actual nature of an agreement to 
determine if it was an assignment or an actual work for hire.84 
The Nimmer Treatise—the quintessential copyright treatise written 
by Melville Nimmer and subsequently updated by his son David 
Nimmer—outlines the established interpretation of work for hire.  
Nimmer has found that an agreement alone should not constitute a 
per se judgment that a work is a work for hire.85  He admits that an 
agreement will typically impose a much higher burden on the hired 
party86 but that the words “work for hire” themselves should control 
only if the relationship is not “within the scope of employment” 
under the factor test adopted by the Supreme Court.87 
One case demonstrates that an ex post facto written agreement did 
not create a work for hire if the relationship did not actually fall 
within that scope. In Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon,88 the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered the bounds of 
termination when faced with a subsequent agreement to assign.  The 
court found that a settlement agreement, which the parties entered 
into long after the creation of a comic book and which stated that the 
book was a “work for hire,” did not bar termination.89  The court 
noted that the agreement was created after the work had already 
been done, but in concluding that the agreement did not make the 
work a “work for hire” for purposes of termination, the court relied 
heavily on the legislative intent behind § 304(c), the pre-1978 
termination provision.90  The court was concerned that allowing the 
                                                          
rights are minimal.  The current inclusion of sound recordings in the [w]orks-made-
for-hire provision would have a detrimental effect on these struggling artists.”). 
 84. See infra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 85. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 5.03[B][1][b][ii] (2014). 
 86. Id. § 5.03[B][1][b][ii] n.98.1. 
 87. Id. § 5.03[B][1][b][ii].  However, Nimmer appears primarily concerned with 
agreements in a typical employer-employee relationship when the employee is 
working outside of the scope of his employment and states that such agreements 
should be considered assignments rather than works for hire for the purposes of 
termination.  Id. 
 88. 310 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 89. Id. at 292. 
 90. See id. at 290 (construing the legislative history of the provision after 
concluding its plain language was ambiguous).  Section 304 of the Copyright Act is 
being used here because it is the termination provision for pre-1978 works.  Section 
304 has language concerning work for hire and “any agreement to the contrary” that 
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plaintiff to bring a claim in this case would compromise the essence 
of the legislation because the provision was meant to protect authors 
from their initial poor bargaining power.91  The court stated: 
If an agreement between an author and publisher that a work was 
created for hire [was] outside the purview of § 304(c)(5), the 
termination provision would be rendered a nullity; litigation-savvy 
publishers would be able to utilize their superior bargaining 
position to compel authors to agree that a work was created for 
hire in order to get their works published. . . .  We conclude that 
Congress included the “notwithstanding any agreement to the 
contrary” language in the termination provision precisely to avoid 
such a result.92 
The Second Circuit also used the Nimmer Treatise to support its 
conclusions, thus further demonstrating the acceptance of Nimmer’s 
test.93  Even though the court relied in part on the fact that the 
settlement agreement was signed years later—which if anything would 
demonstrate a better capability of the parties to bargain equally—the 
court held that the agreement should not foreclose termination.94 
Commentators and the courts therefore agree that “the actual 
relationship between the parties, rather than the language of the 
contract,” will establish work for hire.95  Industry contracts or 
standards should not be controlling when interpreting the copyright 
law, especially when certain interests are clearly marginalized.96 
                                                          
is identical to § 203, which applies to post-1978 works and is the provision most 
relevant to this Comment. 
 91. Id. at 290–91. 
 92. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 93. Id. at 291 (citing NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 85, § 11.02[A][2]). 
 94. Id. at 290–91. 
 95. Emily Burrows, Note, Termination of Sound Recording Copyrights & the Potential 
Unconscionability of Work for Hire Clauses, 30 REV. LITIG. 101, 120 (2010) (examining 
work-for-hire clauses in recording contracts). 
 96. Nimmer has also considered the possible ramifications of termination rights 
on the recording industry and has found that there are many problems with few 
solutions.  See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 85, § 5.03[B][2][a][ii][IV] (“For if such 
agreements can prevent background artists from terminating, then why are the 
featured artists allowed to ignore their own contracts with the record industry, which 
likewise bar such terminations?”). 
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D. Termination Rights:  What They Are and How to Use Them 
Congress passed the 1971 sound recording amendment to fight 
piracy of sound recordings;97 however, the industry quickly became 
vexed by the prospect of termination rights.  Termination rights, as 
mentioned previously, are the ability of the author to recapture rights 
that were assigned away years prior.98  Because it would be incredibly 
difficult to overcome the pre-1978 work-for-hire doctrine,99 the focus 
of this Comment will be on the relevant termination provision that 
applies only to post-1978 works:  § 203.100 
Beginning thirty-five years after the execution of the grant,101 and 
within five years of the thirty-five year mark, an author can assert his 
or her termination rights by written notice to an assignee.102  The 
notice must state the date of termination, which will fall within the 
same five-year period.103  The termination will grant all rights that had 
been given away back to the author but allow the assignee the 
continued use of any derivative works already in existence.104 
Work for hire is a statutory exception to the termination right.105  
However, “[t]ermination of the grant may be [a]ffected 
notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, including an 
agreement to make a will or to make any future grant.”106  The 
language “any agreement to the contrary” has been interpreted, in 
pre-1978 works, to include any general assignment of the rights even 
                                                          
 97. See Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (adding protections 
for sound recordings to the Copyright Act); supra note 77 and accompanying text 
(explaining the purpose of the 1971 amendments). 
 98. 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2012). 
 99. Act of Oct. 15, 1971 § 1. 
 100. 17 U.S.C. § 203; cf. id. § 304(c) (outlining termination rights for pre-1978 
works).  Even though federal protection for sound recordings began in 1972, this 
Comment focuses on the implications of termination after 1978 since it is far less 
likely that session musicians would qualify for copyright under the pre-1978 work-
for-hire doctrine.  See infra note 211 (explaining the particulars of the 1909 Act 
work-for-hire doctrine). 
 101. Authors can grant their rights to a third party in “any means of conveyance or 
by operation of law,” and they can assign either all or part of the § 106 bundle of 
rights.  17 U.S.C. § 201(d).  Transfers of copyright must be done by written 
agreement.  Id. § 204(a). 
 102. Id. § 203(a)(3)–(4). 
 103. Id. § 203(a)(4). 
 104. Id. § 203(b)(1)–(2). 
 105. Id. § 203(a). 
 106. Id. § 203(a)(5). 
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if the assignee tried to resist the right of termination.107  Therefore, 
even if the contract stated that all rights were assigned, the copyright 
would still subject to termination, and this is likely true using the 
same clause in the post-1978 termination provision.  The key to 
determining whether termination applies is whether the contract is 
an assignment or a work for hire. 
In recent years, many authors or their heirs have come forward to 
exercise this statutory right.108  Typically, termination will result in a 
new negotiation and may not actually result in termination.109  The 
key aspect of the termination right is that authors are able to return 
to the negotiating table to generate a more appropriate deal for the 
future of the copyright based on any change that occurred over the 
past thirty-five years.110 
E. The Current Work-for-Hire Doctrine 
There are two ways that a work can be a “work for hire” under the 
1976 Act’s definition.  The first requires that the work be within the 
scope of employment.111  The second requires that the work fall into 
a pre-determined list of nine types of commissioned works and that 
an express agreement in writing by the parties designates the work as 
a work for hire.112  Notably, sound recordings are not included on the 
                                                          
 107. Cf. supra note 92 and accompanying text (providing the Second Circuit’s 
interpretation of “any agreement to the contrary” in § 304(c)). 
 108. See, e.g., Milne ex rel. Coyne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., 430 F.3d 1036, 1037–38 
(9th Cir. 2005) (indicating that Winnie-the-Pooh children’s book author A.A. Milne’s 
heirs asserted termination rights to his works after his death); Siegel v. Warner Bros. 
Entm’t Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1114 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (concerning an action by 
the widow and daughter of one of the creators of the Superman comics asserting 
termination rights in the comics). 
 109. See Milne, 430 F.3d at 1037–38 (finding that a renegotiation of rights at the 
prior renewal term created a new assignment).  Some contracts and payment 
schemes specifically account for termination after thirty-five years. 
 110. The 1976 Act eliminated the renewal right in copyright, but the termination 
provision was a compromise for authors since it provided them with a similar means 
to regain rights in their works after a certain number of years.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-
1476, at 124 (1976) (finding the need for such a provision due to the “unequal 
bargaining position of authors, resulting in part from the impossibility of 
determining a work’s value until it has been exploited”). 
 111. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 112. Id. (listing the types of works as those “for use as a contribution to a collective 
work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a 
supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer 
material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument 
signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire”). 
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list; however, this was not always the case.  After Congress passed the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act in 1998,113 there was a quick and 
powerful move by certain lobbyists in the music industry to pass a 
“technical amendment” that included sound recordings in the list of 
commissioned works.114  Artists and unions reacted swiftly to oppose 
this amendment.115  Many people viewed this amendment as a severe 
change to the statute, and it was almost immediately repealed.116  At 
hearings following the technical amendment concerning whether the 
change was in fact a technical amendment and its effects on the 
current law, some industry and copyright leaders supported 
termination rights for lead or featured musicians but were wary of 
broadening that definition to session musicians in particular.117  
Some considered restricting the language of a new proposed 
amendment to only the “major contributors” on a sound recording,118 
                                                          
 113. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 114. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, app. I, 113 
Stat. 1501, 1501A-521 (2000) (amending the Copyright Act with the Intellectual 
Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999); see also H.R. REP. NO. 
106-464, at 105–06 (1999) (Conf. Rep.) (“Sound recordings have been registered in 
the Copyright Office as works made for hire since being protected in their own right.  
This clarifying amendment shall not be deemed to imply that any sound recording 
or any other work would not otherwise qualify as a work made for hire in the absence 
of the amendment made by this subsection.”); David Nimmer & Peter S. Menell, 
Sound Recordings, Works for Hire, and the Termination-of-Transfers Time Bomb, 49 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 387, 391–92 (2002) (describing the results of the recording 
industry’s lobbying efforts and recording artists’ consequential uproar to the 
“lobbyists’ backroom handiwork”). 
 115. Nimmer & Menell, supra note 114, at 391–92. 
 116. See Work Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 
106-379, 114 Stat. 1444 (repealing the addition of sound recordings to the work-for-
hire commissioned works definition). 
 117. See, e.g., Hearing:  Sound Recordings as Work Made for Hire, supra note 83, at 72 
(prepared statement of Sheryl Crow) (refuting arguments that the work-for-hire 
amendment was “necessary to clarify who is the author of the sound recording” since 
“[t]here is no confusion in the record industry” that featured artists and not hired 
musicians, producers, or others create sound recordings). 
 118. See id. at 21 (prepared statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyright, 
Copyright Office of the United States, Library of Congress) (arguing that “an 
unfettered termination right” that was available to every person who performed on a 
recording would be “unworkable” and that there is a need for “a carefully calibrated 
termination right” specific to featured artists); see also id. at 76 (statement of Michael 
Green, President and CEO of Recording Academy, National Academy of Recording 
Arts & Sciences, Inc.) (testifying that performers besides the featured artist have “a 
contractual understanding through industry standard agreements” that they have no 
claim to authorship in the sound recording and “[t]his has been the standard 
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but the proposed amendment ultimately did not pass.  Even though 
the statute now states that the repeal of the technical amendment 
should not affect courts in their interpretations one way or 
another,119 it is difficult to see how that will be the case.  At the very 
least, the repeal demonstrated a move away from easily finding sound 
recordings to be works for hire under § 101.120 
The first portion of the work-for-hire definition, that the work must 
be within the scope of employment, leaves much more room for 
interpretation than the subsequent portion.  Indeed, when the 1976 
Act first came into effect, the circuits were split over the proper 
interpretation of this clause.121  Under the pre-1978 work-for-hire 
doctrine, the main inquiry was the amount of control, as 
demonstrated by several pre-1978 cases as well as a very recent case 
that applied the 1909 Act doctrine to comic book characters.122  The 
“instance and expense” test asked solely whether the employer had 
the right to control the work and whether it had taken the financial 
risk of the project.123  The work-for-hire doctrine was completely 
revamped in the 1978 Act, which confined commissioned works to 
those enumerated in the § 101 definition, while all other 
                                                          
practice forever”).  But see id. at 66 (statement of Marci Hamilton, The Thomas H. 
Lee Chair in Public Law, Cardozo School of Law) (suggesting that recording 
companies can “certainly handle” the transaction costs of having to renegotiate the 
termination of a particularly lucrative work and that “the equities are pretty clear”). 
 119. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (stating that the brief reform and removal “shall [not] 
be considered or otherwise given any legal significance”). 
 120. Sound recordings were commissioned works and likely considered works for 
hire for the limited time they were covered under the technical amendment.  See 
Hearing:  Sound Recordings as Work Made for Hire, supra note 83, at 111 (quoting 
Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, as stating that sound recordings made after 
November 29th and before the repeal of the amendment were “a problem”). 
 121. See, e.g., Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding 
that only formal salaried employees qualify under § 101’s scope of employment 
circumstance); Easter Seal Soc’y for Crippled Children & Adults of La., Inc. v. 
Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 334–35 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that the term 
“employee” should be interpreted literally and consistently with law of agency 
principles); Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 552–53 (2d Cir. 
1984) (applying a standard that looked at whether the employer had wielded control 
over the contractor). 
 122. See Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119, 139 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding 
that a work is created at an employer’s “instance and expense when the employer 
induces the creation of the work and has the right to direct and supervise the 
manner in which the work is carried out” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. 
dismissed, 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014).  The instance and expense test creates a strong 
presumption favoring the employer.  Id. at 140. 
 123. Id. at 139. 
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employment relationships focused on whether the work was done in 
the “scope of employment.”124 
Eventually, the Supreme Court in Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid125 decided that agency law would be the governing 
standard for deciding whether an employee is working in the scope 
of employment.126  The Community for Creative Non-Violence 
(“CCNV”), a non-profit organization specializing in homelessness 
awareness, sued Reid, the sculptor it had hired to produce a 
sculpture depicting a homeless family.127  After Reid created the 
sculpture, he rejected the CCNV’s proposal to take it on tour because 
the material was so fragile.128  The parties did not have a written 
agreement, and the CCNV asserted copyright ownership over the 
work.129  The CCNV argued that Reid had created the sculpture as a 
work for hire.130  The Court adopted the agency model of employee 
from the Restatement (Second) of Agency131 and outlined several 
factors that courts should consider when they assess whether a hired 
party is working within the scope of their employment—in addition 
to “the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by 
which the product is accomplished”—including: 
the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the 
location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the 
                                                          
 124. 17 U.S.C. § 101.  Some scholars have considered whether a sound recording 
could qualify as “collective works” or “compilations” under § 101.  E.g., Randy S. 
Frisch & Matthew J. Fortnow, Termination of Copyrights in Sound Recordings:  Is There a 
Leak in the Record Company Vaults?, 17 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 211, 221–24 (1993) 
(providing arguments for and against sound recordings as § 101 specially 
commissioned works).  Considering the severe backlash from including sound 
recordings as a technical amendment, it is unlikely that sound recordings 
automatically warrant work-for-hire status.  See Hearing:  Sound Recordings as Work Made 
for Hire, supra note 83, at 34 (prepared statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of 
Copyright, Copyright Office of the United States, Library of Congress) (stating that 
adding sound recordings to the commissioned works outlined in the second part of 
the work-for-hire definition was “a substantive amendment to the law, not a technical 
amendment as some have claimed”). 
 125. 490 U.S. 730 (1989). 
 126. Id. at 743. 
 127. Id. at 732–33. 
 128. Id. at 735. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 738–39. 
 131. Id. at 751–52.  The Third Restatement of Agency, published after the 
Supreme Court decided Reid, does not include factors in its description of when an 
employee acts in the scope of his employment.  Restatement (Third) of Agency 
§ 7.07 (2006).  Courts have not addressed whether the copyright doctrine should be 
changed due to this revision. 
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parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional 
projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party’s 
discretion over when and how long to work; the method of 
payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; 
whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; 
whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee 
benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.132 
The Court asserted, however, that “[n]o one of these factors is 
determinative.”133  The Court determined that CCNV was not an 
employee under the agency test because merely having control over 
the details of the project was not enough.134  Reid was a skilled 
sculptor, provided his own tools, worked from home without daily 
supervision, and only had one short assignment.135  The project was 
also completed outside the scope of the non-profit’s regular business, 
and Reid was not on the employee payroll and did not receive 
employee benefits.136 
The federal circuits readily adopted the Supreme Court’s factor 
test, but they have implemented it in a variety of ways.  The Second 
Circuit interpreted the proper use of the test in Aymes v. Bonelli.137  In 
Aymes, the defendant was a computer programmer who appealed a 
finding that the program he made for the plaintiff was a work for 
hire.138  Here again, the parties did not have a written agreement that 
assigned ownership rights.139  When analyzing the factors, the court 
noted that while the Supreme Court stated that none of the factors is 
dispositive, the Court provided no guidance on how courts should 
weigh them.140  The Second Circuit found that some factors will have 
little to no relevance and some will be significant in nearly every 
situation.141  It explicitly noted the following five factors as almost 
always being key to the interpretation:  “(1) the hiring party’s right to 
control the manner and means of creation; (2) the skill required; (3) 
the provision of employee benefits; (4) the tax treatment of the hired 
party; and (5) whether the hiring party has the right to assign 
                                                          
 132. Reid, 490 U.S. at 751–52 (footnotes omitted). 
 133. Id. at 752. 
 134. Id. at 752–53 (finding instead that the employee was an independent contractor). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 753. 
 137. 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 138. Id. at 858. 
 139. Id. at 860. 
 140. Id. at 861. 
 141. Id. 
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additional projects to the hired party.”142  The Second Circuit found 
that other courts have adopted a similar approach by weighing only 
the relevant factors in the individual case.143  In Aymes, the court 
found that the plaintiff’s work was not a work for hire because even 
though the employer had a right to control his work product, the 
other factors weighed against the employer, particularly the factors 
that emphasized the plaintiff’s payment and tax treatment.144 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in JustMed, Inc. v. 
Byce145 was more hesitant than the Second Circuit to focus on the 
employment arrangement between a software engineer and a start-up 
software company.146  The Ninth Circuit found that the software 
engineer was an employee and not an independent contractor even 
though he was not given direction and did not receive employee 
benefits.147  The court noted that the nature of a start-up company 
could make these factors less indicative of an employment 
relationship.148  However, the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the 
Second Circuit’s approach, which heavily emphasizes the employee 
benefits factor.149  The Ninth Circuit instead largely relied on the 
amount of control exhibited by the employer.150  The court reasoned 
that although it would generally be “unfair[]” for the employer to 
treat a worker as an employee in one context and an independent 
                                                          
 142. Id. 
 143. Id.  At least one other circuit has adopted the Second Circuit’s approach 
from Aymes.  See Kirk v. Harter, 188 F.3d 1005, 1009 (8th Cir. 1999) (determining that 
a computer programmer was an independent contractor rather than an employee 
after considering the programmer’s tax treatment, benefits, skill level, ability to hire 
a subcontractor, and ability to consult other outside companies). 
 144. See Aymes, 980 F.2d at 862–63 (“[T]he importance of these [employee benefits 
and tax treatment] factors is underscored by the fact that every case since Reid that 
has applied the test has found the hired party to be an independent contractor 
where the hiring party failed to extend benefits or pay social security taxes.”). 
 145. 600 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 146. Id. at 1128 (finding the defendant’s “strongest argument” was based on his 
tax status and fact that he did not receive employee benefits from the company). 
 147. Id. 
 148. See id. (speculating that the employer did not exert very much control 
because it was a new startup company). 
 149. Id. (“There is a danger, however, in relying on them too heavily, because they 
do not bear directly on the substance of the employment relationship—the right to 
control.  In this case, the factors do not decisively favor [the software engineer], 
especially when one considers [the technology startup company’s] business model.”). 
 150. Id. 
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contractor in another, that concern was irrelevant in the instant case 
due to the startup nature of the business.151 
The weight of each factor is up to some dispute in the circuits.  The 
two most influential circuits for copyright and the entertainment 
industry in particular—the Second and Ninth—favor relatively 
different interpretations.  There will be an analysis of these factors in 
regards to session musicians below.152 
F.  The Current Judicial Joint Authorship Doctrines:  The Ever Expanding Scope 
Once the artist overcomes the work-for-hire hurdle, he will still 
have to claim some type of ownership in the copyright in order to 
assert his right to terminate.  This becomes particularly complicated 
when a work has many contributors with varying degrees of 
contribution, such as in a sound recording.  This section will consider 
the statutory language and outline how various circuit courts 
interpret the definition of joint authorship.  Primarily, it will 
consider the circuit courts’ views on both the requirements of intent 
and the amount of copyrightable material necessary to establish 
joint ownership. 
To claim joint authorship, the artist’s work must fall into the § 101 
definition of joint work, which states that the work must be “prepared 
by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be 
merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary 
whole.”153  Though this may appear to be a simple enough standard 
at first glance, there are contradictory opinions on the necessary 
intent and the contributions needed by each party. 
Childress v. Taylor154 established the most widely accepted test for a 
joint work, called the Childress test, which requires that each author’s 
contribution be copyrightable on its own.155  In Childress, the 
defendant did most of the background research and urged the 
plaintiff to write a play about the comedienne “Moms” Mabley.156  
The court concluded the defendant was not a joint author because 
research is not copyrightable in itself.157  The court in Childress also 
                                                          
 151. Id. 
 152. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 153. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 154. 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 155. Id. at 508–09. 
 156. Id. at 502. 
 157. Id. at 509 (accepting, without analysis, the trial judge’s determination that 
research is not copyrightable). 
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discussed how the parties lacked the intent to be joint authors.158  
The court set a relatively high bar for intent, requiring that the joint 
authors not only intend for their work to be comingled but also that 
they intend to be joint authors.159  Prior cases had only regarded the 
intent “to become part of a unitary work,”160 but several courts have 
subsequently adopted and expanded this higher standard for intent. 
The Ninth Circuit applied the Childress test in Aalmuhammed v. 
Lee161 and also created a three-pronged approach to determine the 
intent portion of joint authorship.162  In this case, Aalmuhammed was 
the cultural aid for the movie, Malcolm X.163  Aalmuhammed helped 
direct and write the movie and provided guidance to ensure cultural 
accuracy in certain scenes.164  The court found that the case turned 
on the director’s intent to regard Aalmuhammed as a co-author.165  
The court interpreted a much stricter rule for joint authorship, which 
considered (1) whether the author exercised control over the work, 
(2) whether the purported co-authors objectively showed intent to be 
joint authors, and (3) whether the audience’s “appeal of the work 
turn[ed] on both contributions” such that each person’s share in the 
success was indistinguishable from the other’s share.166  The court was 
persuaded by the implications that a broad interpretation of co-
authorship could have on the movie industry.167 
Nimmer believes that joint authorship requires only that a 
contribution have more than de minimis contribution of authorship 
                                                          
 158. Id. at 508 (requiring “some distinguishing characteristic of the 
relationship” be understood by the parties in order to have the necessary intent for 
joint authorship). 
 159. Id. at 509 (“That equal sharing of rights should be reserved for relationships 
in which all participants fully intend to be joint authors.”). 
 160. Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1319 (2d Cir. 1989); see also Eckert 
v. Hurley Chi. Co., 638 F. Supp. 699, 702 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (“The narrower and 
better view is that each author when making his or her contribution must intend it 
to constitute a part of a total work to which another shall make (or has already 
made) a contribution.”). 
 161. 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 162. Id. at 1233–34 & n.24. 
 163. Id. at 1229. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 1235–36. 
 166. Id. at 1234. 
 167. See id. at 1233 (“Everyone from the producer and director to casting director, 
costumer, hairstylist, and ‘best boy’ gets listed in the movie credits because all of 
their creative contributions really do matter. . . .  A creative contribution does not 
suffice to establish authorship of the movie.”). 
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that does not need to be separately copyrightable.168  Nimmer 
essentially follows the plain language of the Copyright Act.169  
Generally, other scholars and the courts have disfavored the Nimmer 
test.170  Nimmer argues that there is nothing in the plain language of 
the statute that requires the parts to be separately copyrightable.171  A 
recent case vindicated the Nimmer test in part, which may lead other 
courts to also use the test as the standard for copyrightability.172  For 
example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Gaiman 
v. McFarlane173 considered whether the defendant could claim joint 
authorship in the comic book character he had created and in the 
greater work to which he had contributed.174  The court stated: 
The decisions that say, rightly in the generality of cases, that each 
contributor to a joint work must make a contribution that if it 
stood alone would be copyrightable weren’t thinking of the case in 
which it couldn’t stand alone because of the nature of the particular 
creative process that had produced it.175 
To illustrate the point, the court used the example of two 
professors—one who has great ideas but cannot write and one who 
has mediocre ideas but can write.176  In that situation, the Seventh 
Circuit asserted that it would be proper for the authors to be 
considered joint authors even though one author contributed only 
uncopyrightable material.177  Gaiman remains somewhat of an outlier 
in the line of cases that continue to apply the Childress test, but 
because the case was decided relatively recently and there has not 
been subsequent case law to determine if this is part of a trend, it 
may demonstrate a move toward a less stringent interpretation of 
joint authorship. 
                                                          
 168. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 85, § 6.07. 
 169. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“A ‘joint work’ is a work prepared by two or more 
authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or 
interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”). 
 170. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 85, § 6.07[A][3][b] (discussing the resistance 
to Nimmer’s interpretation of the proper test). 
 171. Id. § 6.07[A][3][a]. 
 172. See id. § 6.07[A][3][c] (discussing the “vindication” of the Nimmer test 
through a recent case that did not require both joint authors to contribute 
independently copyrightable content). 
 173. 360 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 174. Id. at 648. 
 175. Id. at 659. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See id. (suggesting that these hypothetical individuals’ “intent” to be joint 
authors “would be plain”). 
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Another notable copyright scholar, William Patry, is split between 
the two tests.  Patry states that Childress has been misconstrued as 
requiring both parties to contribute independently copyrightable 
material.178  He suggests that Childress required only that an individual 
contribute some kind of expression but that the expression need not 
stand alone as a separately copyrightable material to be regarded as 
joint authorship.179  Therefore, he believes that only a minimal 
amount of expression is required.  However, he does favor the 
requirement that both parties demonstrate mutual intent in order to 
be regarded as joint authors.180  Unlike the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Aalmuhammed, Patry argues that intent should not rely heavily on the 
dominance of one party over another because “[h]ard-and-fast rules 
can never answer the many nuanced fact situations sure to be 
presented by collaborative, creative efforts.”181  Patry contends that 
“the parties must have an intent to be joint authors in the lay sense, 
i.e., colleagues striving together in a creative process.”182  This 
interpretation would possibly include other contributors, but Patry 
notes how evidence of one-time fees to contributors could 
demonstrate a lack of mutual intent to be joint authors.183 
Joint authorship is no longer used as a means for smaller players in 
a group work to claim authorship because of the various circuits’ 
interpretations limiting who can claim to be a joint author.  The 
courts will likely consider both the intent of the parties as well as the 
type of work they contribute.  Though Gaiman moves away from the 
requirement that each author contribute stand-alone copyrightable 
content, smaller contributors will likely still have difficulty proving 
their intent to be joint authors. 
G. Independently Copyrightable Material:  Support for the Supporting Players 
Beyond joint authorship, there is still a possibility that a copyright 
owner could claim some type of authorship in the work that it 
contributed to the whole.  This section will consider the possibility 
that an author could claim such rights independently of joint 
authorship.  It outlines the recent case law that supports such a 
                                                          
 178. 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 5:16 (2014) (suggesting that 
Childress “did not endorse the ‘independently copyrightable’ language”). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. § 5:18. 
 181. Id. § 5:23. 
 182. Id. § 5:21. 
 183. See id. § 5:24 (suggesting the provision of minimal fees “is fairly strong 
evidence that the dominant author viewed the contributor as a volunteer”). 
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proposition and concludes that in certain instances, authors probably 
can claim copyright in independently contributed material. 
In Thomson v. Larson,184 the Second Circuit applied the majority 
Childress test but also left a small gap for copyright owners to possibly 
recover for the use of their copyrightable material outside of joint 
authorship.185  In the case, Thomson had been helping Larson write 
the musical Rent.186  Larson was the main author, but Thomson had 
also made substantial contributions to the play as a dramaturge.187  
The court found that Thomson lost her claim for joint authorship on 
intent rather than contribution.188  The more interesting part of the 
case is what the court left open—that Thomson might have had a 
copyright interest in the work that she contributed separately and 
could have potentially brought an infringement claim against 
Larson’s estate for unlawful use of her particular contributions.189  
The court refused to hear the issue because Thomson first presented 
it on appeal.190 
A recent copyright case in the Ninth Circuit has more explicitly 
opened the door to this type of authorship claim. An initial ruling 
awarded the plaintiff, an actress, a preliminary injunction based on 
her minor performance in a film.191  The actress had a minor role in 
an amateur film that was never produced, but her scene was used in a 
subsequent film called the “Innocence of Muslims.”192  She was 
dubbed in the film so that it appeared she was asking if Mohammed 
was a child molester.193  She soon became subject to death threats 
from extremists on YouTube and attempted to take down the video 
on YouTube through copyright notice and takedown procedure.194 
                                                          
 184. 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 185. See id. at 206 (noting that the Second Circuit has not had the opportunity to 
consider whether a person “mak[ing] a non-de minimis copyrightable contribution 
but cannot meet the mutual intent requirement of co-authorship[] retains . . . any 
rights and interests in his or her own contribution” (emphasis omitted)). 
 186. Id. at 197. 
 187. Id. at 197–98. 
 188. See id. at 202, 206–07 (applying Childress and finding that even if a putative 
author makes a quantitatively large contribution to a work, the author will lack co-
ownership of the work if the parties lacked mutual intent for joint ownership). 
 189. Id. at 206. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 743 F.3d 1258, 1269 (9th Cir.), amended by 766 F.3d 
929 (9th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, 771 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 192. Id. at 1261. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 1262. 
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The plaintiff did not claim joint authorship but instead claimed 
that she had contributed independently copyrightable material to the 
film.195  The Ninth Circuit found sufficient evidence to support the 
plaintiff’s claim for independent copyrightable material and reversed 
the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment to the 
filmmaker.196  This opinion sparked a fierce outcry and opposition 
from various parties.197  The court had amended the opinion but 
retained the basic premise of the argument while, at the same time, 
noting that it is possible the district court will find that the actress 
does not in fact have a copyrightable interest on remand.198  However, 
this opinion has since been vacated by a pending en banc review. 
In his dissenting opinion to the original order, Judge Smith was 
less convinced, reasoning that the Ninth Circuit in Aalmuhammed had 
rejected a claim for authorship in one’s individual performance in a 
film.199  Judge Smith noted that because the actress did not exercise 
creative control over the project and her role was not separately 
copyrightable as a “motion picture,” she should not be able to claim 
ownership.200  However, the majority clearly recognized the possibility 
of a third type of authorship:  a contribution to a copyrighted work.201  
Though this opinion is no longer good law, it demonstrates varying 
opinions among judges on the panel. 
On November 12, 2014, the Ninth Circuit agreed to rehear this 
case en banc and the oral arguments occurred December 15, 2014.202  
                                                          
 195. Id. 
 196. See id. at 1263, 1269 (finding that a small acting role in a film could constitute 
independently copyrightable content). 
 197. See, e.g., Corynne McSherry, Ninth Circuit Doubles Down in Garcia v. Google, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (July 11, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/ 
2014/07/ninth-circuit-doubles-down-in-garcia-v-google (detailing the opposition to 
the ruling because it “amounts to a prior restraint of speech, something that should 
never happen where the underlying claim is ‘doubtful’”). 
 198. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 935 (9th Cir.) (“Nothing we say today 
precludes the district court from concluding that Garcia doesn’t have a 
copyrightable interest, or that Google prevails on any of its defenses.”), reh’g en banc 
granted, 771 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 199. Garcia, 743 F.3d at 1272–73 (Smith, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
Aalmuhammed “forecloses” the court’s decision because the actress had a “minimal” 
role in the film). 
 200. Id. at 1271–72. 
 201. Id. at 1264–65 (majority opinion) (stating that an actor can claim a copyright 
interest in his own contribution but not in pre-existing material, such as the content 
of the script). 
 202. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 771 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 2014).  A live webcast of the 
oral arguments is available on YouTube.com. Pasadena CRS 3:30 PM Monday 
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It is difficult to speculate what the outcome of this case will be.  There 
are multiple ways that the case could turn out, each of which have 
possible repercussions for this Comment. 
Though an authorship claim for independently contributed 
material has not been presented in much case law, the possible 
holding in a Ninth Circuit case and the dicta in the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Larson demonstrate that such claims may gain favor with 
the courts.  Therefore, even without joint authorship, this avenue 
could give authors another means to claim authorship in their 
smaller contributions to a larger work. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A session musician’s ability to terminate his rights in sound 
recordings requires overcoming multiple hurdles due to authorship 
concerns.  The termination right was intended to support the original 
authors of works.203  Session musicians have been undervalued and 
undercompensated for works that remain considerably popular and 
prominent for years after their creation.  The addition of digital 
sampling to the music scene also created new avenues for recording 
companies to profit from the works of session musicians who receive 
little compensation from sampling and usually no other forms of 
royalties.204  Termination rights are a means for these musicians to get 
a piece of the future earning of their works as the works continue to 
enjoy success both in traditional and new mediums. 
Session musicians have a unique purpose in the music industry and 
have different experiences depending on their level of skill and the 
type of work they do.205  This Part argues that session musicians who 
contribute more than a de minimis amount of work to a sound 
recording should be able to terminate their rights. 
A. Session Musicians Are Generally Not Employees for Hire 
When applying the work-for-hire doctrine to session musicians, 
courts must consider the actual relationship between the parties in 
addition to the documents that were signed.  The answer to whether 
                                                          
12/15/14, YOUTUBE (Dec. 15, 2014) https://www.youtube.com/watch? 
v=EMTaBkOBR2Q [hereinafter Garcia Oral Arguments]. 
 203. See supra note 110 (explaining that termination rights were so important to 
the 1976 Act because the 1976 Act eliminated the renewal right). 
 204. See supra Part I.A.2 (detailing laws pertaining to digital sampling). 
 205. See supra Part I.A.1 (describing the recording industry and session 
musicians’ place therein). 
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a musician is an employee for hire is very fact dependent, but general 
rules can be extracted from the thicket of factors. 
1. Recording contracts do not present substantial obstacles to termination 
The first presumption against the session musician occurs when the 
artist signs the papers, which may occur at the time or before the 
sound recording is first made.  These contracts typically include a 
work-for-hire clause, but the clause should not condemn the artist to 
work-for-hire status.206  As David Nimmer has stated, “[I]t is the 
relationship that actually exists between the parties, not their 
description of that relationship, that is determinative.”207  As 
demonstrated in Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, the existence of an 
agreement will likely not in itself create a work for hire.208  Therefore, 
an agreement must portray the actual working relationship.  In the 
case of musicians who contribute substantially to the sound recording 
beyond what is directly prescribed by sheet music, it is difficult to say 
in all circumstances that they were employees for hire. 
2. Reid and Aymes suggest that session musicians are not employees for hire 
The Reid factors are tantamount to understanding whether a 
session musician will qualify for termination rights.  The Reid analysis 
is very fact-specific; however, many session musicians encounter 
similar situations regarding many of the factors beyond the “manner 
and means by which the product is accomplished.”209 
As Aymes has become one of the most well recognized 
interpretations of the work-for-hire doctrine in the Second Circuit, it 
may control in subsequent interpretations because many circuits 
emulate the Second Circuit in copyright decisions.210  Even though 
                                                          
 206. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 207. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 85, § 11.02[A][2]. 
 208. Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 290 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 209. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989). 
 210. See, e.g., Kirk v. Harter, 188 F.3d 1005, 1009 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding the 
Second Circuit’s approach in Aymes was “persuasive”).  But see JustMed, Inc. v. Byce, 
600 F.3d 1118, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010) (arguing that “[t]here is a danger . . . in relying 
on [the Aymes factors] too heavily”); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 85, 
§ 5.03[B][1][a][iv] (noting that while some courts have followed Aymes, “the 
categorical gloss of Aymes v. Bonelli should be considered suspect . . . [and] a better 
approach emerges from authority outside the Second Circuit”  (footnotes omitted)); 
PATRY, supra note 178, § 5:68 (stating that some courts have followed the Aymes 
court’s emphasis on financial factors but “other courts . . . have correctly examined 
and emphasized other factors as well as the totality of the parties’ relationship, which 
is the true test”). 
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the Ninth Circuit is more reluctant to weigh the employee financial 
factors as heavily as the Second Circuit, its focus on control is more 
reminiscent of the 1909 Act211 and thus does not appear to follow the 
heart of the Supreme Court’s analysis in Reid.212  Also, the Ninth 
Circuit was particularly concerned with the start-up nature of the 
employer,213 and that is not the case here with a far more established 
and sophisticated recording industry. 
The Reid factors focus the inquiry on whether the parties had a 
typical employment relationship.  An independent contractor should 
not qualify under Reid as an employee, and most session musicians 
are independent contractors.  The potential employer’s right to 
control the work product is important but not dispositive.214  In the 
case of session musicians, this is the one factor in a work-for-hire 
inquiry that will vary most widely.215 
a. The control factor varies widely among session musicians. 
The first issue to consider is whose control matters.  Session 
musicians are hired either under contractual arrangements with 
recording studios or under less formal arrangements with featured 
artists.216  If a featured artist hired the session musician, the session 
musician would have a simpler time asserting that the recording 
studio did not have a strong case for control.217  On the other hand, if 
                                                          
 211. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 62, 35 Stat. 1075, 1087–88 (“[T]he 
word ‘author’ shall include an employer in the case of works made for hire.”). 
 212. Compare Reid, 490 U.S. at 752 (concluding that control is one factor of the 
analysis but that control “is not dispositive”), with JustMed, Inc., 600 F.3d at 1128 
(finding control to be a far more relevant factor in the context of a small start-up 
company than the Aymes court’s interpretation). 
 213. JustMed, Inc., 600 F.3d 1118 at 1128. 
 214. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 751 (listing the “right to control” as the first of many 
factors in consideration). 
 215. Control depends on a wide variety of fact-specific factors whereas other 
factors such as payment and source of instrumentalities are likely more standard 
industry-wide or at least have fewer variations. 
 216. KEMBREW MCLEOD & PETER DICOLA, CREATIVE LICENSE:  THE LAW AND CULTURE 
OF DIGITAL SAMPLING 291 n.10 (2011). 
 217. Reid cited a case that asked whether bandleaders of a Hilton Hotel band were 
employees or independent contractors.  See Reid, 490 U.S. at 752.  In Hilton 
International Co. v. NLRB, the Second Circuit held that “steadily-engaged hotel 
musicians are not hotel employees, but rather, employees of their band leaders.”  690 
F.2d 318, 321 (2d Cir. 1982).  The court reasoned that Hilton did not exercise 
control over the “manner” of the performances since the bandleaders hired the 
members of their bands directly.  Id.  Selection of the “repertoire, instruments used, 
style, tempo, and other standards of performance” were left to the bandleader, and 
the contract with the Hilton was for the band as a whole—not for the individual 
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the recording company hired the session musician directly, then that 
relationship will be most important to a work-for-hire analysis.  Also, 
if the recording company uses a studio it does not own or allows the 
featured artists to use their own studios, an even more tenuous link of 
control would exist between the recording company and the session 
musician.  The recording company would need to control the process 
as directly as possible for the musician to be a worker for hire.  Some 
industry players have tried to argue that a featured artist is an 
employee of the record company when a featured artist creates a 
sound recording.218  However, even though session musicians may 
generally exhibit less control over recordings than featured artists, 
they still control their particular performances.219 
Once a direct link to the record company is defined, control of a 
sound recording is best considered by (1) genre and (2) the artistic 
control asserted on the session musician by those in the studio.  
Certain musical genres create a greater opportunity for creative 
expression by the particular artists in the recordings than others.  
Creative control is therefore strongly influenced by the nature of the 
creative process.220  Musicians that work in classical or pop music 
genres likely have minimal control over their creative 
                                                          
players.  Id.  Therefore, at least under the Second Circuit’s analysis, a session 
musician that is hired solely by the featured artist has a strong claim for control.  It is 
difficult to say how often that was the case since many of these sessions occurred and 
relationships were formed so many years ago. 
 218. See sources cited supra note 118 (providing testimony of several industry 
experts, including some who believed that the change to include sound recordings 
in the definition of “work for hire” was a technical amendment).  But see Jessica 
Johnson, Comment, Application of the Copyright Termination Provision to the Music 
Industry:  Sound Recordings Should Constitute Works Made for Hire, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
661, 664 (2013) (arguing that sound recordings should qualify as works for hire).  
What is most interesting about the featured artist becoming an employee for hire is 
that a featured artist often has far more contractual restrictions and requirements 
than a session musician.  See M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY & SIDNEY SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS 
OF MUSIC:  THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 186 (Robert Nirkind & 
Sylvia Warren eds., 10th ed. 2007).  Record companies can often assign other 
projects or will require a certain amount of touring or music releases under the 
contract.  Id.  Featured artists may be more like employees for hire than session 
musicians because of the long nature of featured artists’ contractual relationships 
with recording companies.  Id. 
 219. See, e.g., supra notes 25–27 (detailing a variety of typical session musicians’ 
contributions to recordings’). 
 220. See PATRY, supra note 178, § 5:23 (acknowledging the “many nuanced fact 
situations” that arise in creative endeavors, particularly with regard to joint 
authorship claims). 
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contributions.221  Typically, the music in these genres is thoroughly 
planned, and the performers have strict guidelines concerning what 
to play.  In classical music, for example, session musicians must 
perform faithfully what is written on the page.  Diversion from the 
composer’s original intent would not only produce harmonic chaos, 
but it would also misrepresent the composer’s original intellectual 
work.  On the other hand, jazz and funk recordings require far less 
stringent direction because the styles are based in part on 
improvisation.  Many times, the musicians will be part of the creative 
contribution because they are given a chord progression on which to 
improvise their part.222  The creation of music in these genres is far 
more fluid than in others.223  Rock and country songs may have 
certain parts that require creative ingenuity (e.g., guitar riffs,224 drum 
solos,225 and vocal harmonies226), and in those cases, session musicians 
could create those parts with the guidance of the other musicians 
in the session.227 
                                                          
 221. See, e.g., Zoe Chace, How Much Does It Cost to Make a Hit Song?, NPR (June 30, 
2011, 3:58 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2011/07/05/137530847/how-
much-does-it-cost-to-make-a-hit-song (outlining the creation of a hit pop song and 
the producer’s managing of the singers in the studio); Bill Stensrud, Classical Music 
After the CD, BUS. CLASSICAL MUSIC BLOG (Dec. 9, 2008, 2:19 PM), 
http://businessofclassicalmusic.blogspot.com/2008/12/classical-music-after-cd.html 
(describing existing classical music recordings as “homogenized perfection” while 
suggesting that major music labels will soon stop making new classical recordings). 
 222. Cf. supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text (demonstrating the means by 
which session musicians contribute to the creative content of recordings). 
 223. In England, a key case on a similar issue helped determine the authorship of 
the song “A Whiter Shade of Pale.”  In the case, an expert musicologist testified that 
the band, which created the song, worked with the songwriter in the group to 
arrange the particular recording so that each musician contributed substantial 
material, including hooks, countermelodies, and intros.  Fisher v. Brooker, [2006] 
EWHC (Ch) 3239, [45] (Eng.).  Even though they were members of a band, the 
same idea holds true for certain session musicians. 
 224. Cf. Zabrocki, supra note 13 (“Ninety-five percent of the time they require 
easy, if creative, guitar playing.”). 
 225. See Bloch, supra note 23, at 188, 195 (arguing for the copyrightability and 
possible protection of drumbeats in light of digital sampling because drum beats can 
“influence countless musicians”). 
 226. See 20 FEET FROM STARDOM, supra note 26 (indicating that certain prolific 
background singers were given “free reign” to contribute to the recording in 
whatever means necessary). 
 227. A session musician will get charts that map out the structure of the piece, and 
the length and depth of these charts can vary widely in the realm of country; thus, a 
session musician’s independent contributions to a country song often vary.  See A DAY 
IN THE LIFE OF A NASHVILLE SESSION MUSICIAN, supra note 27 (detailing a typical 
session for a country session musician).  The same is true for background vocalists on 
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The other important consideration for control is the specific 
artistic control the lead musician or recording company has over the 
session musician.  Musicians typically bring personal technique and 
style to their work, therefore making it difficult to determine to what 
extent a third party can control a musician’s artistic output.  Even 
where the lead musician gives direction and ideas about the sound 
and parts, each contributing musician’s sound is unique.228  Many 
recording studios or lead musicians choose certain session musicians 
for their unique sound and timbre.229  Even though style 
contributions are not copyrightable,230 they are contributions 
nonetheless and are solely the creation of the musician. It may also 
take little direction at all for many skilled musicians to “get it right,” 
and the absence of clear control in such situations could work in 
their favor because of the control factor in a work-for-hire analysis.231 
On the other hand, recording studios and featured artists often 
state that they have complete control over the end product and have 
the right to reject any parts that are not satisfactory.232  However, this 
general control does not necessarily overlap with the specific 
control over the content.  These arguments would be far more 
persuasive under the 1909 Act,233 but the 1976 Act requires more 
than just bare control.234 
                                                          
many of the most important rock recordings of the 1980s and 1990s. See generally 20 
FEET FROM STARDOM, supra note 26. 
 228. Musicians are often treasured for their “own particular sound or their 
mastery of one particular skill or style.”  Big George Webley, A Personal View of Session 
Programmers, Part 1:  Musicians, SOUND ON SOUND (Oct. 1998), 
https://www.soundonsound.com/sos/oct98/articles/sessionmusic.html.  Others 
have cautioned musicians from taking jobs that they are not a fit for because it might 
waste others’ time and the musician’s reputation.  Gaetano, Comment to Tips for 
Becoming a Recording Studio Session Musician, MUSIC THINK TANK, (Oct. 18, 2012), 
http://www.musicthinktank.com/blog/tips-for-become-a-recording-studio-session-
musician.html. 
 229. See supra notes 28–33 and accompanying text (detailing the work of various 
session musicians and their ability to contribute copyrightable content). 
 230. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (omitting style contributions from a list of 
copyrightable items). 
 231. See PIERCE, supra note 26, at xiv–xv (stating that producers will often not give 
session musicians a lot of direction during a recording session, particularly if a 
producer has worked with a musician before). 
 232. See id. at xv–xvi (noting that producers and the artist decide what instruments, 
musicians, studio, and engineers to use and many other various details of a session). 
 233. See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text (detailing the strict “instance 
and expense” test used under the 1909 Act). 
 234. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 752 (1989) 
(explaining that control is only one factor in the analysis). 
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In the end, the question is to what extent should the courts get 
involved in determining the hierarchy and control exhibited in a 
recording studio thirty-five years ago.  Often there will be evidentiary 
issues with determining the record company’s control because of the 
time gap between the recording’s creation and termination as well as 
the lack of records supporting either side.235 
b. The other Reid factors suggest session musicians are independent 
contractors rather than employees for hire. 
All of the remaining Reid factors are relatively similar in application 
for most session musicians.  The first factor is the skill required.  This 
factor weighs in favor of all session musicians because they must be 
very skilled on their chosen instruments to remain competitive in the 
industry.236  The best session musicians are contacted often and are so 
popular that producers and artists will wait for them to become 
available before recording.237 
The second factor is the source of the instrumentalities.238  
Considering that session musicians are very skilled professionals and 
often have strong attachments to their instruments, they more than 
likely provide their own instruments. This is particularly true for 
vocalists.  Using their own instruments weighs in session musicians’ 
favor.  However, the instrumentalities to create the recording, such as 
the studio and recording gear, will be provided by the producer or 
the record company.239  Both the recording company and the 
musician contribute vital portions of the instrumentality, so at the 
very least the factor weighs equally for both parties. 
The duration of the relationship also likely weighs in the favor of 
the musicians.240  Musicians are typically only hired for one session or 
                                                          
 235. See, e.g., In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1098 (N.D. 
Cal. 2002) (noting that Napster argued that the “absence of any evidence of an 
employment relationship . . . precludes plaintiffs’ claim of authorship” and that the 
plaintiffs admitted they could not produce “contracts with artists to demonstrate an 
employment relationship”). 
 236. PIERCE, supra note 26, at xvi; Life as a Studio Musician, supra note 9 (stating 
that session musicians “have to be really fantastic on [their] chosen instrument”). 
 237. PIERCE, supra note 26, at xv–xvi. 
 238. Reid, 490 U.S. at 751; see Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 864 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(weighing the instrumentality factor “negligibl[y]” because the computer 
programmer was required to use the hiring party’s computers). 
 239. KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 218, at 186. 
 240. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 751 (listing the duration of the parties’ relationship as a 
relevant factor). 
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on a per session basis.241  There are strict union guidelines about the 
length of sessions and frequency of sessions.242  Because the typical 
session is only composed of hired hands, these musicians essentially 
act as independent contractors for that session.243  The hiring party 
will probably not have the right to assign additional projects because 
of union agreements.244  Even though a session musician may be 
hired again, it is likely that this will be a part of a separate work and 
agreement; therefore, this factor also weighs in session musicians’ 
favor.245  For non-union musicians, it is possible that they will be hired 
with less stringent guidelines.  This could weigh against them 
depending on whether the agreement requires a certain number of 
sessions or restricts the time of the particular job. 
The hiring party likely has discretion over when and how long the 
session musician will work;246 however, labor laws can play a large role 
in regulating the contracts.  Due to the restrictive nature of recording 
contracts for union musicians,247 recording companies do not have 
full discretion over the time the musicians work.  Though the recording 
company does determine when the recording will take place, this 
factor will likely balance due to contractual restrictions concerning 
the time a musician can spend on any particular recording.248 
Sound recording is the recording studio’s business, and hiring a 
musician is within a studio’s normal course of business.249  This factor 
                                                          
 241. See supra text accompanying note 35 (noting session musicians are paid by 
the job). 
 242. See supra text accompanying notes 36–41 (outlining union-specific 
requirements for recording contracts). 
 243. See Aymes, 980 F.2d at 864 (finding that even though Aymes worked for a long 
period for Island, he worked for others at the same time and this factor should not 
necessarily weigh heavily against him). 
 244. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 751 (indicating that a hiring party’s “right to assign 
additional projects to the hired party” is a factor relevant to whether the hiring 
party has control over the hired party); supra note 57 and accompanying text 
(detailing the explicit union contracts that are necessary for each job if a session 
musician is part of a union). 
 245. See Aymes, 980 F.2d at 864 (finding that gaps in employment suggest that 
Aymes was not a full-time employee). 
 246. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 751 (including discretion over the duration of work as a 
relevant factor). 
 247. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text (outlining several union 
contract requirements). 
 248. See Aymes, 980 F.2d at 862, 864 (finding that Island had significant control of 
and gave significant input into the creation of the software and yet this was not 
entirely determinative of the outcome). 
 249. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 752 (listing “whether the work is part of the regular 
business of the hiring party” as a factor). 
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likely weighs against the musician.  However, the recording company 
does not play or create music itself.  Rather, it records music, so this 
factor depends on the narrowness of a court’s interpretation of 
“regular business.”  The business of the recording company in 
general terms is to sell music and choose the songs to sell.  Since 
hiring musicians is a part of this process, it is likely that this factor 
inevitably weighs against the session musicians.250 
Session musicians are paid at a set rate determined by the union or 
purely by contractual agreements concerning the hours worked.251  
This lump sum payment likely weighs in the session musicians’ 
favor.252  Even though some session musicians do receive special 
payments for uses of their work outside of the original agreement,253 
these payments depend on statutory requirements and should not 
weigh against the musicians.  Payment for the recording is a one-
time, non-royalty payment.  This type of payment weighs in favor of 
the session musician. 
The location of the work weighs against the session musicians.254  
Although many hours of practice went into honing the musician’s 
skills, the location of the work is technically a recording studio.255  
Because the work will be produced at the studio, this factor depends 
on who owns that studio.  Oftentimes, the record company will 
provide the featured artist with a budget, and the featured artist will 
choose where to record, such as in his or her own studio.256  The 
featured artist will usually have these costs later deducted from future 
profits.  Thus, in a way, it is the featured artist, not the recording 
studio, who provides the location.257  Therefore, the location of the 
                                                          
 250. Id.; see Aymes, 980 F.2d at 863 (finding the “regular business” factor weighed 
in favor of Aymes because his work was not a regular part of Island’s business, and yet 
this factor was not weighed heavily and was considered “generally . . . of little use” in 
determining a claim of work for hire (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 251. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 751 (stating “the extent of the hired party’s discretion 
over when and how long to work” is a factor relevant to control); supra notes 37–41 
and accompanying text (describing the contractual rate structure and comparing 
rates for lead and session musicians). 
 252. See Aymes, 980 F.2d at 863 (suggesting that payment of a salary wage tends to 
indicate the recipient is an employee). 
 253. See supra text accompanying notes 50–52 (detailing the small possibility that 
musicians can receive residual payments for work used in different mediums). 
 254. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 751 (including “the location of the work” as a factor). 
 255. See Aymes, 980 F.2d at 864 (finding that since Aymes had to complete his work 
at Island’s office, that factor should not weigh heavily against him due to the 
necessity created by the hiring situation). 
 256. Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 124, at 220. 
 257. Id. 
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work may weigh in favor of the session musician because even though 
the session musician does not have freedom to choose the location, 
the record company does not always specifically provide the location 
either.  However, if the recording company itself does not choose the 
location, it is likely that the company’s agent will and that would work 
against the session musician for location purposes. 
Session musicians are not typically allowed to hire other parties and 
so this factor will weigh against them.  However, in Aymes, the court 
found this factor to be “virtually meaningless” when the other party 
did not require an assistant.258  Because the session musician is meant 
to play a supporting role to the featured artist, it does not make sense 
to hold this factor strongly against him.  A session musician would 
probably not require an assistant even if he had that right. 
Some courts have considered employee benefits and tax treatment 
to be two of the most important factors.259  These factors largely 
depend on the session musician’s membership in a union.  According 
to union contracts, session musicians receive a partial pension and 
must file W-4s for employee tax purposes.260  It would seem against 
good judgment to have a union contract weigh against the musicians 
in this circumstance, and yet it may be the case.  Though the benefits 
provided under the union contracts may create a serious concern for 
session musicians, this factor can likely still be weighed in the session 
musician’s favor when determining if the session musician is an 
employee for hire.  These benefits are still minimal by comparison to 
the benefits received by the recording company’s regular 
employees.261  The main concern for the court in Aymes was that an 
employer should not be able to rely on the benefits of having a 
contractor over an employee without also obtaining the burdens that 
it imposes.262  Therefore, even the union contracts likely will not 
cause substantial harm to a session musician’s claim. 
Outside of the unions, session musicians are not typically given 
employee benefits because they are paid solely for that recording; 
they are therefore less likely to have filed W-4s as in a typical 
                                                          
 258. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 864. 
 259. E.g., id. at 862.  But see JustMed, Inc. v. Byce, 600 F.3d 1118, 1128 (9th Cir. 
2010) (urging against “relying . . . too heavily” on the employee benefits and tax 
treatment factors “because they do not bear directly on the substance of the 
employment relationship—the right to control”). 
 260. See AM. FED’N MUSICIANS SOUND RECORDING, supra note 36, at 1 (detailing the 
benefits bestowed by these union contracts). 
 261. Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 124, at 219. 
 262. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 862. 
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employment relationship.263  The musician is merely a contracted 
party for a particular recording.  Therefore, this factor will more 
easily weigh in favor of a non-unionized session musician.  Though 
this seems contrary to sound policy, the union-contracted workers 
likely receive greater security in their employment because of the 
fixed rates in the contracts.264  Both union and non-union musicians 
have a case on this point, but their respective arguments are 
slightly different.  Any session musician who attempts to make an 
argument that he is not a worker for hire must consider these 
different arguments. 
Most of the factors weigh against finding that session musicians are 
employees and in favor of finding them as independent contractors.  
The Aymes court relied heavily on the employee benefits and tax 
treatment as an indication of employment.265  Even though these 
factors are complicated by the union involvement, they will likely 
weigh in favor of most non-union musicians and many union ones as 
well.  The employment relationship is restrained by union documents 
in order to keep the relationship fair so that whatever union 
musicians may lose in terms of the tax and benefit factors, they likely 
gain in other factors such as the location, time, and payment of the 
work.  Therefore in either case, it is likely that many session musicians 
will not be deemed workers for hire.  As the Supreme Court stated in 
Reid, “Congress meant to refer to a hired party in a conventional 
employment relationship,”266 which is generally not the case with 
session musicians. 
B. Joint Authorship Does Not Qualify Many Session Musicians for Authorship, 
but It Can Likely Provide Some Coverage and Should Provide More 
Session musicians will likely fare differently under the various tests 
that have been judicially created for joint authorship.  This section 
outlines the various joint authorship approaches from different 
circuits as they apply to session musicians.  After comparing the tests 
                                                          
 263. Cf. id. (compiling cases that found “architects, photographers, graphic artists, 
[and] drafters . . . to be highly-skilled independent contractors,” workers who are 
generally not offered normal benefits). 
 264. See generally AM. FED’N MUSICIANS SOUND RECORDING, supra note 36 (providing 
pay rates by type of musician and type of session). 
 265. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 862. 
 266. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 743 (1989); PATRY, 
supra note 178, § 5:68 (“Doubts should be resolved in favor of the hired party 
because work-made-for-hire status represents a significant exception to the general 
statutory rule of individual authorship.”). 
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and how they apply to session musicians, it argues that the Nimmer 
test, which the Seventh Circuit recently employed in Gaiman v. 
McFarlane, best supports the plain language of the statutory joint 
authorship definition. 
The “joint work” definition requires that a work be “prepared by 
two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be 
merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary 
whole.”267  The Childress test is the most widely accepted, and the 
Ninth Circuit’s subsequent interpretation of the necessary intent to 
become a joint author is particularly difficult for many session 
musicians to overcome. 
Under the Childress test, the analysis will be slightly more 
challenging but feasible for some of the most engaged session 
musicians.  The Childress test requires (1) that each author 
manifested intent to share authorship with the other and (2) that 
both authors contributed copyrightable content.268  This test is far 
more demanding for a potential joint author than Nimmer’s test.269  
The intent prong is particularly difficult to reconcile with the nature 
of the session musician’s relationship with a lead artist or a record 
company.270  Record companies generally draft contracts to assign 
rights away from session musicians.  Therefore, a session musician will 
have difficulty proving both parties’ subjective or objective intent to 
be joint authors.271  If there is a special situation where the session 
musician will receive credit for his work on the record or if he will be 
named specifically, it is possible that he will be able to prove this 
intent.  However, for the many session musicians with a lesser role in 
the recording, such intent will be difficult to prove. 
The Ninth Circuit makes it particularly difficult for smaller 
contributors to establish the requisite intent for joint authorship.  
The factors laid out in Aalmuhammed show the Ninth Circuit’s rather 
strict approach to intent.  The Ninth Circuit requires the following 
                                                          
 267. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 268. Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 508–09 (2d. Cir. 1991). 
 269. See infra text accompanying notes 286–89 (suggesting session musicians are 
more likely to be able to prove joint authorship under the Nimmer test than under 
other formulae). 
 270. See supra Part I.A.1 (summarizing how a record company or lead artist 
contracts with a session musician). 
 271. See, e.g., Ulloa v. Universal Music & Video Distrib. Corp., 303 F. Supp. 2d 409, 
411, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding that a guest in the studio who contributed a vocal 
harmony to a Jay Z song could not claim joint authorship because she offered no 
evidence that Jay Z intended to share authorship with her). 
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criteria to show intent in the absence of a contract:  (1) the author 
must exercise control over the work; (2) the putative authors must 
show objective intent to be joint authors; and (3) the appeal to the 
audience must turn on both of the putative authors’ contributions 
such that their individual contributions to the success of the work 
cannot be distinguished from one another.272  The session musician 
may not have creative control over an entire work but may have such 
control over a particular portion of the work to which he adds 
significant improvisation.273  Concerning the second element, session 
musicians will likely have difficulty providing evidence that they and a 
lead artist or recording studio mutually intended to be joint authors 
given the provisions of typical music recording contracts.  Though 
these contracts’ copyright clauses should not always be valid in work-
for-hire contexts,274 they will likely prove a lack of objective intent.275  
The third criterion will weigh in favor of a session musician, especially 
if his contributions are particularly important to a song’s overall 
creative impression, such as one of Clyde Stubblefield’s drum beats 
that has been profusely sampled or a small snippet of the heart of a 
popular song that is intended to allude to the past.276  This element 
will rely heavily on the amount of the contribution and also the 
appeal of that part.277  Such appeal could be demonstrated by how 
often the particular part is sampled—a potentially difficult factual 
and quantitative inquiry.  However, some guitar riffs or vocal lines in 
particular are well known and play a major role in a piece.  Such 
contributions might reach the requisite appeal for the third element.278 
The second prong of the Childress test requires copyrightability of 
each contribution, and some session musicians may satisfy this prong, 
though that will not necessarily qualify them as joint authors.  The 
minimum requirement for copyrightability is an “original work[] of 
                                                          
 272. Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 273. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text (suggesting that session 
musicians’ improvisational playing contributes creative value to music). 
 274. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 275. See PATRY, supra note 178, § 5:26 (indicating that the absence of an explicit 
reference to intent must be weighed against other components of the contract to 
determine whether the parties had intent). 
 276. See COPYRIGHT CRIMINALS, supra note 59 (providing examples of uses for 
digital samples). 
 277. Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1234. 
 278. Cf. Pauline France, Top 10 Instantly Recognizable Guitar Riffs, FENDER (Feb. 12, 
2013, 12:51 PM), http://www.fender.com/news/top-10-instantly-recognizable-guitar-
riffs (listing top guitar riffs that are not necessarily by session musicians but that 
demonstrate the notability of instrumental breaks). 
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authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”279  The 
Supreme Court has determined that originality is a very low bar.280  
Typically, a session musician who contributes a longer portion of a 
piece that could possibly stand on its own as a copyrighted work will 
satisfy this requirement.  Though courts are wary of copyrighting very 
small musical motifs,281 anything beyond a de minimis contribution 
can probably at least reach the level of copyrightable content.282 
Patry and several courts have argued that Childress “did not endorse 
the ‘independently copyrightable’ language.”283  Specifically, Patry 
argues that a mere contribution of copyrightable content, whether or 
not it can stand on its own, is all that is required.284  This sets a slightly 
lower bar for joint authorship that is more likely to support a greater 
number of session musicians.  Because their contributions are of 
musical material that is the type of work copyright law protects, 
session musicians likely satisfy this element.  However, Patry does 
support considering the joint authors’ intent.  His view of intent is 
less encompassing than the Aalmuhammed court’s and therefore likely 
more in line with the statute.285  Musicians probably have a higher 
likelihood of contributing copyrightable material than an actor in a 
play or editor of a novel. 
Session musicians will more likely qualify as joint authors under the 
Nimmer test because it does not require separate copyrightability.  
This test requires (1) more than a de minimis contribution (2) of 
                                                          
 279. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
 280. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (“To be 
sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will 
suffice.  The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some 
creative spark, ‘no matter how crude, humble or obvious’ it might be.”). 
 281. E.g., Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that a 
three-note opening line was not sufficient to sustain an infringement claim). 
 282. Copyrightability is a very low bar and only requires a very small amount of 
creativity.  See supra note 280. 
 283. PATRY, supra note 178, § 5:16. 
 284. Id. § 5:21; see Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 851 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Although it 
is true that a single musical note would be too small a unit to attract copyright 
protection (one would not want to give the first author a monopoly over the note of 
B-flat for example), an arrangement of a limited number of notes can garner 
copyright protection.”); cf. Ulloa v. Universal Music & Video Distrib. Corp., 303 F. 
Supp. 2d 409, 411, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating that “this Court declines to find that 
a countermelody is unoriginal as a matter of law” but rejecting a request for partial 
summary judgment concerning the originality of that countermelody because 
disputed issues of fact existed). 
 285. PATRY, supra note 178, § 5:20 (stating that joint authors must have “intended 
that their contributions be merged into a joint work”). 
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authorship (3) that does not need to be separately copyrightable.286  
The de minimis contribution will be easily met in most cases of 
musical contribution because a solo, riff, or established harmony is 
likely to qualify as more than de minimis.287  The authorship 
requirement is also met easily because it merely requires creative 
contribution beyond a minimal level.288  The session musician should 
also qualify under the third prong because the contribution need not 
even be separately copyrightable.289  Even artists who contribute 
smaller amounts or elements like style or timbre—which are not 
copyrightable on their own—may be able to qualify under this prong 
of the test.  Because the contribution need not be separately 
copyrightable, potentially very little would be necessary to become a 
joint author. 
The Nimmer test is far more akin to the actual language of the 
Copyright Act.  The statutory definition of a “joint work” is “a work 
prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their 
contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of 
a unitary whole.”290  The plain language of the statute does not 
indicate that it either requires both authors to intend to be joint 
authors or for both to contribute copyrightable content. 
The intent factors extrapolated by the Ninth Circuit are equally 
difficult to reconcile with the plain language of the statute.291  The 
court seemed more concerned with industry ramifications than with 
interpreting the plain language of the statute.292  There is no reason 
to expand the statute’s meaning in such a way without the consent of 
Congress.  That said, most of the circuits have been very keen on 
accepting the Childress test as the judicial interpretation of the statute.  
Though Gaiman may demonstrate a shift in the circuits toward the 
                                                          
 286. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 85, § 6.07[A]. 
 287. Especially in the realm of sound recordings, de minimis use is far simpler to 
prove.  See supra note 64 and accompanying text.  For example, a specific musician’s 
input will be determined by his part on the recording though the extent of his 
control over that part might be an issue. 
 288. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 85, § 6.07[A][2] (finding that there must be 
a creative contribution rather than just “physical labor” to qualify as an author of a work). 
 289. Id. § 6.07[A][3][a]. 
 290. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 291. The Ninth Circuit may be rethinking its joint authorship standard and, in 
particular, its holding in Aalmuhammed based on several judges’ comments during 
the Garcia oral arguments.  See Garcia Oral Arguments, supra note 202. 
 292. See Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that 
the enumerated “factors . . . cannot be reduced to a rigid formula, because the 
creative relationships to which they apply vary too much”). 
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adoption of the Nimmer test,293 as the general body of law stands now, 
it is difficult for many session musicians to qualify as joint authors. 
The intent prong that has been read into the statute merely 
perpetuates social norms at the expense of real contributors to a 
work.  Under the current model, any contributor that is not clearly in 
the eyes of the industry worthy of joint authorship cannot claim such 
intent.  This creates an uphill battle for an already underprivileged 
group or person.  A much better interpretation of the statute merely 
requires intent to contribute to a unitary whole.294  This Comment 
argues that the current interpretation of the statute has veered away 
from the proper statutory interpretation and should be modified to 
allow those without intent to be “joint authors” to still be able to 
claim joint authorship as long as they intended their work to be 
merged as part of a “unitary whole.” 
Session musicians would benefit most from the Nimmer test for 
joint authorship regarding copyrightability and prior case law 
regarding intent.  Gaiman in particular has made this interpretation 
more possible.295  Though the Childress test remains the most 
prominent interpretation, the Ninth Circuit adopted Childress but 
also created a wider scope for the intent prong of joint authorship in 
Aalmuhammed.296  The required intent does not need to be this strict, 
as demonstrated by the statutory language and court interpretations.  
More courts should support a lesser intent requirement by following 
earlier case law so that artists that make substantial but limited 
contributions to a work, like session musicians, would be more likely 
to claim joint authorship in their recordings. 
C. Individual Copyrightable Content as a Broader Means of Termination 
In the case of session musicians who may not meet the strict 
requirements for joint authorship, particularly under Childress, the 
Second Circuit’s decision in Thomson v. Larson left open a possible 
                                                          
 293. See supra notes 172–77 (summarizing the Seventh Circuit’s finding of joint 
ownership where a plaintiff’s contribution was not separately copyrightable). 
 294. See Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1319 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating a 
“finding of joint authorship requires that each author intend his or her contribution, 
at the time that it is created, to become part of a unitary work to which another will 
make or already has made a contribution”). 
 295. See Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 658–59 (7th Cir. 2004) (recognizing 
that joint authorship based on more than a de minimis contribution in copyrightable 
“joint labors” requires “originality and creativity”). 
 296. See Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1234 (describing the three-prong test for intent). 
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means of claiming authorship.297  The Ninth Circuit then solidified 
this approach in Garcia v. Google, Inc.; however, the Ninth Circuit has 
now agreed to rehear the case en banc.298  The Second and Ninth 
Circuits, in prior holdings, found that if a musician has a particular 
contribution that is above the de minimis requirements for 
copyrightability, he may possibly terminate that portion of the 
piece.299  This section applies Thomson and the Garcia holding, prior 
to its rehearing en banc, to session musicians and concludes that a 
session musician likely has a strong claim of independent authorship 
in any contribution surpassing a minimal threshold.  This section will 
also discuss possible outcomes of the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision 
in Garcia and their implications for session musicians. 
If we assume that the Ninth Circuit upholds Garcia, Thomson raised, 
and Garcia confirmed, the possibility that an artist may claim 
copyright in his or her work outside of full ownership or joint 
authorship.300  This concept that authorship can occur in a part of a 
whole work is relatively new and could have vast repercussions for 
copyright law.301  The now overturned Garcia holding specifically 
established an actress’s right to claim copyright in her individual 
performance in a film and demonstrated that it is entirely possible for 
a court to rule that a particular part within a creative work like a film 
                                                          
 297. See Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 206 (2d Cir. 1998) (indicating that 
since the Second Circuit has not had an opportunity to determine “whether a person 
who makes a non-de minimis copyrightable contribution but cannot meet the mutual 
intent requirement . . . retains . . . rights” in the absence of a work-for-hire agreement). 
 298. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 743 F.3d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir.) (stating that joint 
authorship is not the only means of proving authorship in a film), amended by 766 
F.3d 929 (9th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, 771 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 299. Cf. Bloch, supra note 23, at 202–03 (arguing that drum beats should be 
copyrightable and that a piece of music can hold multiple copyrights, but finding 
this will not affect past works since drummers are likely works for hire). 
 300. Garcia, 743 F.3d at 1263–64 (allowing an actress to assert copyright in her 
own performance in a film because “nothing in the Copyright Act suggests that a 
copyright interest in a creative contribution to a work simply disappears because the 
contributor does not qualify as a joint author of the entire work”); Thomson, 147 F.3d 
at 206 (finding the court had no occasion to decide whether a contributor had any 
rights or interests short of co-authorship in the full work). 
 301. See Corynne McSherry, Bad Facts, Really Bad Law:  Court Orders Google to Censor 
Controversial Video Based on Spurious Copyright Claim, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. 
(Feb. 26, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/bad-facts-really-bad-law-
court-orders-google-censor-controversial-video-based (forecasting the possible legal 
repercussions of Garcia, especially for the entertainment business and the Internet). 
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or sound recording can claim copyright.302  As the dissent in Garcia 
pointed out, there was an issue with the plaintiff’s case because she 
did not actually claim a work separate from the film:  she claimed that 
her performance in the film itself was copyrightable.303  However, a 
particular musical performance could be copyrightable in a sound 
recording, and therefore a session musician’s claim may be even 
stronger than Garcia’s claim.  The Ninth Circuit also found that 
Aalmuhammed did not dictate its decision.  Aalmuhammed centered on 
the requirements for joint ownership in an entire work but also 
“plainly contemplate[d]” this level of authorship over a portion of a 
film, or for this Comment’s purposes, a sound recording.304  Even if 
the district court were to find on remand that this particular case, 
with its extreme facts, did not demonstrate an independently 
copyrightable contribution,305 that would not necessarily bar a session 
musician’s claim, which would likely be stronger in many respects 
than Garcia’s. 
A sound recording is a fixation of a particular performance.  Each 
part of the performance would qualify as copyrightable content if 
recorded separately because it would qualify as an “original work[] of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”306  Take a 
recorded guitar riff for example.  If longer than a few bars or notes, it 
would likely qualify for at least thin copyright protection.307  The work 
is both original and a work of the type copyright protects because it is 
a sound recording.308  The work would be “fixed” within the 
recording.309  If the Ninth Circuit upholds the finding in Garcia, such 
a claim is far more likely to prevail. 
                                                          
 302. Garcia, 743 F.3d at 1264.  But see McSherry, supra note 301 (stating that the 
facts in Garcia did not warrant such an authorship claim but admitting there might 
be other instances that would). 
 303. See Garcia, 743 F.3d at 1270 (Smith, J., dissenting) (“While Congress 
distinguishes the performance from the work itself, the majority blurs this line.”). 
 304. Id. at 1263–64 (majority opinion) (reasoning that “Aalmuhammed only 
discusses what is required for a contributor to a work to assert joint ownership over 
the entire work”). 
 305. See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 935 (9th Cir.) (“Nothing we say today 
precludes the district court from concluding that Garcia doesn’t have a 
copyrightable interest, or that Google prevails on any of its defenses.”), reh’g en banc 
granted, 771 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 306. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
 307. See supra note 284 and accompanying text (detailing the possibilities of 
copyright protection in small portions of a musical work). 
 308. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–02. 
 309. Id. § 102(a). 
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If the Ninth Circuit reverses the particular finding in Garcia but 
upholds the concept of independent copyrightable content, then 
session musicians likely still have a claim.  Session musicians have a 
much stronger claim than Garcia because their contributions likely 
rise to the level of independent copyright, especially for those with 
substantial contributions to recordings.310  Garcia, by contrast, was an 
actress working off a script, so even if she made artistic style choices, 
those aspects of her performance are not subject to copyright.311 
If the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision completely rejects the 
notion of independent copyrightable content, it would be very 
difficult for session musicians to make these claims in the Ninth 
Circuit unless the Supreme Court were to get involved.  Though the 
idea was first suggested in the Second Circuit, no other courts have 
considered this concept, and so it would be severely weakened as an 
avenue for session musicians. 
Though this Comment argues that a session musician who 
contributes a larger part to a work should be able to claim copyright 
in the particular part to which he has contributed, this argument may 
be severely weakened by the Ninth Circuit’s rehearing en banc 
decision in Garcia.  Assuming the Ninth Circuit completely rejects this 
argument, session musicians would have to rely more heavily on joint 
authorship claims.  As discussed above, these claims are difficult using 
the current case law, but small changes in interpretation to better 
align with the plain wording of the Copyright Act could provide 
session musicians with much better claims.  Therefore, even without 
Garcia, there are other ways to better serve session musicians within 
the framework of the Copyright Act. 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Session musicians who make less than a de minimis contribution to 
a work should be able to earn more for works that remain popular or 
are sampled years later.312  As mentioned above, there is still a right in 
                                                          
 310. See supra text accompanying notes 61–63 (discussing small musical 
contributions as rising to the level of copyrightable content in infringement suits). 
 311. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (stating copyright does not “extend to any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery”). 
 312. See Gabriel Jacob Fleet, Note, What’s in a Song?  Copyright’s Unfair Treatment of 
Record Producers and Side Musicians, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1235, 1236–40 (2008) 
(summarizing the joint authorship issues session musicians face today, conceding 
that many session musicians will not establish joint authorship in their contributions, 
and recommending a revised copyright statute that does not differentiate between 
types of contributions such as melody, lyrics, a guitar riff, and rhythmic foundation). 
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digital sound recordings that will compensate session musicians at a 
small rate when their work is used on platforms such as Pandora.313  
There should be a means for session musicians to retain certain 
royalties in the future licensing and sale of their work beyond what 
little the unions have been able to negotiate since 1995.314 
The United States could emulate England and that country’s 
recent changes to its copyright terms.  In England, sound recording 
rights have been extended from fifty to seventy years after the owner’s 
death.315  However, as a means of compensating the other artists on 
the recording, a separate provision pays session musicians twenty 
percent of sales from publication of recordings in which they 
participate.316  England has therefore acknowledged the importance 
of session musicians and their contributions. 
It is time for the United States to acknowledge that session 
musicians deserve more monetary compensation and credit for their 
immense creative contributions.317  These musicians have significantly 
impacted the music industry and they deserve to be recognized and 
compensated, especially when other artists digitally sample their 
works.  The above considerations could present a way for these 
musicians to be compensated better for their work on profitable 
recordings beyond termination. 
CONCLUSION 
There are multiple ways to compensate and provide attribution to 
session musicians for their performances on sound recordings.  Most 
session musicians are not employees for hire and sign contracts that 
only temporarily assigned away their rights.  Therefore, many session 
musicians who contribute more than a de minimis amount to a 
recording likely qualify for termination rights.  Lesser contributors 
                                                          
 313. See About Digital Royalties, supra note 48 (defining digital royalties and 
explaining how and to whom they are distributed). 
 314. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (providing some of the elements of 
the current American Federation of Musicians recording agreement). 
 315. Press Release, Gov’t of the U.K., Musicians Benefit from Extended Copyright 
Term for Sound Recording (Nov. 1, 2013), available at https://www.gov.uk/ 
government/news/musicians-benefit-from-extended-copyright-term-for-sound-recordings. 
 316. Id. 
 317. But see David M. Liston, Note, Songwriter, Side Musician, or Sucker?:  The 
Challenge of Distinguishing Composers from Contributors Under U.S. Copyright Law and the 
Lessons from a Famous British Case, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 891, 917–21 (2013) (arguing 
that the United States should not follow the British precedent in recognizing session 
musician contributions and that the joint authorship test should be even more 
restrictive). 
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who cannot rely on joint authorship might be able to terminate the 
particular copyright in the specific portion that they contributed.  
And even the Ninth Circuit rejects the concept of independent 
copyrightable content in Garcia on rehearing en banc, courts should 
interpret joint authorship claims more in line with the plain language 
of the Copyright Act to allow session musicians to make viable 
authorship claims and to exercise termination. 
Those session musicians who may contribute even less and cannot 
make any authorship claims should still be compensated for what 
they have contributed.  The ramifications of these changes, or 
termination rights, might be difficult for the music industry.  
However, there should be a way for musicians to reap the rewards of 
their creative labor.  After thirty-five years, termination is less of a 
burden on the industry and would create greater equality for session 
musicians who were left out of the financial and overall control of 
these famous recordings. 
Many session musicians could qualify for termination; however it is 
likely that musicians either will not terminate, or if they do bring a 
claim, will have companies buy them out or renegotiate their contract 
terms.  Congress established termination rights to help the original 
owners of a copyrighted work gain power in future bargaining and 
get a second bite at the apple.  Considering the amount of time that 
has passed and the fact that musicians did not know about the power 
of sampling at the time many of these recordings were created, 
termination would be an equitable way for them to gain back 
rights that they lost.  Many of these artists have been silently 
contributing to some of the most loved hits of the last several 
decades,318 and they deserve to be properly recognized and 
compensated for their contributions. 
                                                          
 318. See Andrews, supra note 6 (providing examples of session musicians’ well-
known contributions). 
